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ABSTRACT 
Reward cues acquire distinctive incentive properties from their association with 
motivationally significant outcomes. These incentive properties are manifest in an 
augmented salience that provides reward cues with the capacity to attract attention, 
also in contexts where pursuing the reward is not relevant. I will first examine the 
unresolved debate concerning the learning parameters that define the cue-reward 
association and eventually modulate attention. Specifically, whether the cue attentional 
salience is governed by reward expectancy or uncertainty. I will then study another 
incentive property of reward cues, that is the ability to strengthen the performance of a 
separately learned instrumental action exerted to obtain an outcome, a phenomenon 
known as Pavlovian-Instrumental transfer (PIT). Since the motivational value of reward 
is altered when reward is devalued, an interesting question is whether the incentive 
properties of reward cues change accordingly, both in the attentional and in the operant 
domain. Therefore, I will investigate the effects of motivational shifts on the incentive 
properties of reward cues, by means of reward devaluation. In the context of the ability 
of a cue attentional salience to update in accordance with the altered outcome value, I 
will further analyze the influence of incentive learning (i.e. the possibility to re-associate 
the cue with the devalued outcome). The procedures adopted through the experiments 
share two main phases: a learning phase in which human thirsty participants learned 
cue-beverage reward associations involving different contingencies, and a test phase in 
which no reward was delivered. During the learning phase, participants accumulated the 
beverage reward that acted as an incentive, since it was not consumed through this 
phase. This allowed a controlled devaluation procedure by consummatory satiation (i.e. 
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a motivational shift) that was administered at different moments during the 
experiments depending of the hypothesis at test. Results showed that the cues that 
better predicted the reward during learning were the stimuli preferentially attended at 
test, and the stimuli that invigorated more the instrumental action for the outcome. 
These incentive attributes persisted despite reward devaluation: the attentional bias 
and the PIT effect emerged unaltered after participants quenched their thirst. Reward 
cues persisted in capturing attention after reward devaluation even when participants 
were given the chance for incentive learning by means of an additional learning phase. 
Taken together, the evidence that emerged indicates that the incentive properties of 
reward cues, once acquired, can surprisingly and irrationally outlast reward devaluation 
and can resist incentive learning, suggesting that some incentive properties of the cue 
can become independent from those of the reward. These results may provide 
important implications for the understanding of the psychological mechanisms 
underlying different types of addiction. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Everyday our cognitive system is bombarded with a multitude of stimuli that 
recall us or allude to rewarding goods or experiences. In most societies at present, it is 
hard not to encounter a marketing sign on a daily basis. Those signs (or cues) are often 
not only shimmering in colors and sophisticated in design, but also well-conceived to 
evoke hedonic memories, desires or symbolic values in the attempt to spur the 
consumption of rewarding products. So, for example, seeing the sign of a pizza can make 
us hungry, even if a moment before we were not thinking of food. At the same time, a 
luxury car brand can call to mind beliefs, attitudes, and even personality traits - a set of 
concepts that have nothing in common with the mechanics of a motor vehicle. The 
psychological mechanism, whereby some stimuli are capable to evoke certain qualities 
of the associated reward, and to trigger its pursuit, is a form of associative learning 
known as Pavlovian conditioning (Bindra, 1978; Toates, 1986). Crucially, conditioned 
incentive stimuli are powerful attractors that grab our attention and incite action, a fact 
that is beautifully captured by the etymology of the word “advertising”, which comes 
from the Latin ad vertere, namely "to turn toward". Conditioning and other learning 
mechanisms play a fundamental role in determining the organism consumption of food 
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and other substances, and provide a perspective for understanding maladaptive 
motivational behaviors such as compulsive food seeking and addiction. 
FROM REINFORCES TO INCENTIVES 
The traditional view posits that the main function of reward is to reinforce the 
association between two stimuli (S-S, Pavlovian conditioning), or between stimulus and 
response (S-R, Instrumental conditioning). However, since the original studies of Bindra 
(1978) and Toates (1986), an additional view have been proposed to account for the 
type of learning that occur in conditioning. According to this particular view, the main 
role of reward is to provide incentive motivation rather than to reinforce or “stamp in” 
the S-S or the S-R association (Berridge, 2001; Kringelbach & Berridge, 2016). Within 
this theoretical framework, the conditioned stimulus (CS) can acquire the motivational 
properties of the unconditioned stimulus (US), by means of Pavlovian learning. Hence, 
once conditioning has taken place, the CS works not only as a predictor of the US 
occurrence, but, importantly it can also trigger the desire of the associated US (Berridge, 
2012). Therefore, the cue is salient not only because it generates an expectation about 
the arrival of the reward, but because the cue itself becomes an incentive stimulus with 
motivational properties. The incentive theory of reward provided a theoretical 
framework to explain apparently irrational phenomena like autoshaping and operant 
stereotypies, which were commonly observed in animal studies. In the autoshaping 
phenomenon, indeed, the animal approaches and tries to consume the reward cue itself 
(i.e. the CS), a behavior that might appear irrational and bizarre, and that reveals that 
the animal’s attention is totally captured by the reward cue, even in the extreme case of 
the (reward) omission contingency (Schwartz & Williams, 1972). 
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THE INCENTIVE-SENSITIZATION THEORY OF ADDICTION  
The ability of some Pavlovian cues to attract attention and to trigger the pursuit 
of their associated reward or US has been described in the framework of the incentive-
sensitization theory of addiction (Berridge & Robinson, 1998, 2016, T. E. Robinson & 
Berridge, 1993, 2008). In this framework, a particular type of implicit “wanting” (or 
incentive salience), well distinguishable from learning or explicit cognitive desires 
(Berridge & Robinson, 2003), is defined as a type of wanting for reward triggered by 
Pavlovian cues and by the unconditioned reward itself. Crucially, the notion of incentive 
salience rests on two key psychological processes, attention and motivation. Hence, a 
cue with a great incentive salience can trigger a “wanting” for the associated US, a form 
of visceral and irrational desire that motivates the organism to obtain the reward, but 
that differs from the explicit wanting, which is a rational cognitive wish (Berridge & 
Robinson, 2003). At the same time, the cue incentive salience engages the organism’s 
attention, so that the Pavlovian cue behaves like an attentional magnet or attractor, 
while also promoting the action to obtain the corresponding reward or US. 
Mesocorticolimbic brain systems and dopamine neurotransmission, previously thought 
to be responsible for hedonic pleasure (Wise, 2004) and then for learning about rewards 
(Schultz, 1998), might instead mediate this type of “wanting” (Badiani, Berridge, Heilig, 
Nutt, & Robinson, 2017; Berridge, 2012). According to the theory, “wanting” is often 
correlated with “liking” (i.e. the hedonic component of reward), but dissociable under 
some circumstances (Tindell, Smith, Berridge, & Aldridge, 2009). The theory posits that 
a cue for reward can trigger a desire to seek that reward, but not only that. The 
behavioral attractiveness is therefore a hallmark of “wanting” or incentive salience. 
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Accordingly, the attentional system of humans and other animals seems to be 
biased towards cues that predict motivationally significant outcomes (Chelazzi, Perlato, 
Santandrea, & Della Libera, 2013). The responsiveness of the attentional system towards 
valuable stimuli has been largely investigated in the last decade, and a great bulk of 
evidence has accumulated showing that reward-predicting cues attract covert and overt 
attention. The evolutionary benefits of this attentional bias are evident. Reward cues act 
like motivational magnets: they automatically and involuntarily attract eye-fixation 
(Chen, Cheng, Zhou, & Mustain, 2014; Pool, Brosch, Delplanque, & Sander, 2014; 
Theeuwes & Belopolsky, 2012) and deviate ocular movements (Hickey & Van Zoest, 
2012). Stimuli that have been trained in association to a reward become distractive for 
the motivational value they acquire, independently of their physical salience or their 
relevance to the task (Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2011). The ability of some cues to 
grab attention and to trigger the desire for their associated reward can be so powerful to 
become in some cases pathologic, as in drug addiction. Indeed, drug addicts are often 
inevitably attracted by drug cues, which in turn trigger compulsory drug craving and 
consumption (Berridge & Robinson, 2016). 
THE PRESENT WORK  
The aim of the present work is to investigate the behavioral attributes of 
incentive salience of reward cues in humans, by looking at how human perception and 
behavior is affected by the presence of stimuli that formerly predicted an incentive 
outcome. In Chapter 2 and 3, the focus is to determine the learning mechanism that 
governs the relation between a cue and a reward, and that is responsible of endowing a 
reward cue with the behavioral attributes of incentive salience. By further manipulating 
the physiological state that underlies different motivational states, in Chapter 4 and 5 I 
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examine how the incentive salience of reward cues can be modulated, and what are the 
factors that might influence such modulation. In Chapter 6, the aim is to explore how 
time and learning can alter the motivational properties acquired by reward cues. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ATTENTIONAL BIAS: 
THE UNCERTAINTY FACTOR  
A LEARNED ATTENTIONAL BIAS 
The debate on how reward predicting stimuli attain the capacity to bias attention 
arose decades ago in the field of associative learning (for a review see Le Pelley, 2004) 
and fostered a line of research investigating how nonhuman animals attend to the 
environment as a result of conditioning (Pearce & Bouton, 2001). Independently from 
the associative learning tradition, a more recent line of research has suggested that 
learning influences the capacity of stimuli to capture attention in visual search tasks 
(e.g., Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2011). Recently, these two research areas have been 
considered together in order to broaden the understanding of the relation between 
learning and attention (Le Pelley, Mitchell, Beesley, George, & Wills, 2016). The present 
chapter aims at further exploring the relation between attention and reward in the 
context of associative learning. 
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EXPECTANCY VS .  UNCERTAINTY  
The literature addressing the influence of learning on attention is dominated by 
two main views. One view, advocated by Mackintosh (1975), claims that attention is 
preferentially allocated towards the relatively best reward predictor, and therefore the 
cue’s salience would increase with the strength of the cue-reward association. The idea 
that the cue attentional salience is proportional to the reliability of the information 
regarding the outcome prediction is exemplified by the predictiveness principle. 
Analogously, the learned value encapsulates the idea that the cue attentional salience is 
proportional to the motivational significance of the outcome prediction. It has already 
been proposed that the predictiveness principle and the learned value are intimately 
related (Le Pelley et al., 2016); therefore, here I shall refer to them as the expectancy 
hypothesis. Alternatively, Pearce and Hall (1980) proposed that attentional salience 
should be greatest for cues followed by uncertain consequences, probably because 
uncertainty does not allow to develop an automatic response to the cue, and therefore a 
continuous monitoring of the cue-outcome relation is required. The role of this 
monitoring process has been acknowledged in a recent attempt to reconcile two 
apparently opposite views (Beesley, Nguyen, Pearson, and Le Pelley. 2015). According to 
the authors, the uncertainty hypothesis is reflected in the attentional exploration of 
potential useful cues, whereas the attentional exploitation of cues with the goal of 
maximizing the information benefit would be associated to the expectancy hypothesis. 
Existing evidence provides support in favor of both the expectancy and the 
uncertainty hypothesis. However, when the human literature is reviewed altogether, 
there seems to be stronger evidence in favor of the expectancy hypothesis than the 
uncertainty hypothesis (Le Pelley et al., 2016). That said, the debate is not yet resolved. 
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Indeed, while there are data in support of a hybrid model describing effects consistent 
with both views (Beesley et al., 2015; Luque, Vadillo, Le Pelley, & Beesley, 2016), a more 
thorough examination of the uncertainty condition seems advisable. More specifically, it 
has been suggested that a Pearce-Hall type of processing might emerge when it is 
necessary to explore several sources of information providing uncertain predictions 
about the outcome, a condition that has not been fully investigated yet. In other words, 
procedures in which the role of attention was to exploit the information given by highly 
reliable cues have produced evidence in favor of the expectancy hypothesis. However, 
procedures in which there is the need to unveil the causal role of multiple uncertain cues 
have been overlooked, and might instead provide evidence in line with the uncertainty 
principle. 
THE PREDICTION ERROR PERSPECTIVE  
The difference between the Mackintosh view and Pearce and Hall view can also 
be described in terms of prediction error (Pearce & Bouton, 2001; Rescorla & Wagner, 
1972; Schultz, 2006), with the former view claiming that attention is preferentially 
driven by cues associated with a small prediction error, and the latter view claiming 
instead that attention is summoned by cues associated with a large prediction error. It is 
worth noting that a common methodological feature characterizes previous studies 
establishing that attention is preferentially allocated toward cues that are more likely 
associated with a fixed amount of reward, or toward cues that predict the largest 
amount of reward. All those studies have employed a procedure in which expectancy is 
high and uncertainty is low or zero (e.g., Chen et al., 2014, 2013; Failing & Theeuwes, 
2014). Reward expectancy increases monotonically as the reward probability (p) goes 
from 0 to 1, whereas reward uncertainty is minimal for extreme probabilities and 
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maximal for a probability of .5. Therefore, when for instance a p = .8 reward cue is 
compared with a p = .2 reward cue, the results from human studies showed that the best 
reward predictor (p = .8) gains the largest attentional salience (Anderson et al., 2011; 
Anderson & Yantis, 2012; Theeuwes & Belopolsky, 2012; Wang, Duan, Theeuwes, & 
Zhou, 2014). It should be noted, however, that human and animal studies directly 
comparing uncertainty and expectancy have used extreme values of probability: namely, 
p = .5 to induce the maximum uncertainty, and p = 1 to induce the maximum expectancy. 
Within this procedure, the results showed that unreliable cues (p = .5) seem to attract 
more attention than reliable ones (p = 1) (Hogarth, Dickinson, Austin, & Brown, 2008; M. 
J. F. Robinson, Anselme, Fischer, & Berridge, 2014; M. J. F. Robinson, Anselme, Suchomel, 
& Berridge, 2015).  
Therefore, an interesting question is how a combination of reward expectancy 
and reward uncertainty would affect the cue’s attentional priority when both conditions 
generate a non-zero reward prediction error, a frequent condition in the real life. To put 
it formally, the question is whether a p = .5 cue is more salient than a p = .8 cue, a 
comparison that, to my knowledge, has never been conducted before. Contrasting a p = 
.5 vs. a p = .8 cue-reward contingency could be highly informative because, according to 
a recent study, any reward cue must be associated with a certain level of reward 
prediction error to develop attentional priority (Sali, Anderson, & Yantis, 2014). 
It follows that to evaluate the impact of expectancy and uncertainty on the cue 
attentional salience one should exclude the experimental condition in which the reward 
prediction error is zero. Consequently, the following experiments tested the attentional 
capture triggered by a reward cue for three levels of cue-outcome probability (.2, .5, and 
.8). In such uncertain scenario, a strategy of attentional exploration of the cue-outcome 
relation is strongly encouraged, which would favor the possibility to observe that the 
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major factor controlling the reward cue attentional salience is uncertainty rather than 
expectancy. 
In Experiment 1, thirsty participants first performed an instrumental 
conditioning task in which they had to decide whether or not to respond to a colored 
stimulus (i.e., the reward cue) to obtain a liquid reward, with a given level of probability. 
Then, in the following extinction phase, participants were engaged in a visual search 
task, where target and distractor letters were presented inside the previous reward 
cues, now irrelevant for the task (see Figure 2). In Experiment 2, the cues selection 
history was equalized (Awh, Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 2012) during the conditioning 
task, in order to control that the potential attentional bias emerged in the test phase was 
a genuine effect of the cue’s predictability and not of its selection history (Chapman, 
Gallivan, & Enns, 2014). By adapting a procedure of omission contingency from Le Pelley 
and colleagues for conditioning (Failing, Nissens, Pearson, Pelley, & Theeuwes, 2015; Le 
Pelley, Pearson, Griffiths, & Beesley, 2015; Pearson, Donkin, Tran, Most, & Le Pelley, 
2015), Experiment 3 tested the attentional bias towards cues that had never been task 
relevant, not even during the conditioning phase. Experiment 3 is crucial in two aspects. 
First, it separates definitively any potential attentional modulation due to prior 
conditioning from the influence of selection history, even at a conceptual level. Second, it 
implements for the first time a hybrid approach based on a training phase and a 
separate test phase, in which the reward cues are always task irrelevant (Anderson & 
Halpern, 2017). 
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EXPERIMENT 1 
METHODS 
Participants 
Thirty undergraduate students (Mage = 22.1 years, 20 females) took part in the 
experiment after providing informed consent. They were asked not to drink for about 4 
hours prior to the experimental session. They received €5 compensation for their 
participation. 
Apparatus 
Participants were seated in a dimly illuminated room with their head supported 
by a chin rest located at 60 cm from the monitor (1920x1080 resolution, 100 Hz). The 
generation and presentation of the stimuli was controlled by using Matlab and 
Psychtoolbox-3 (Pelli, 1997), running on Windows 7. A liquid delivery apparatus was 
placed on the right side of the monitor and was triggered by the computer. Each delivery 
consisted of 2 ml of water dropping into a visible cup (see Figure 1). 
 
 18 
 
Figure 1. Apparatus of Experiment 1. 
(a) General setting. (b) Detail of the liquid delivery apparatus. 
 
Stimuli 
Conditioning phase 
The cue was an outlined colored ring (2° in diameter, 0.25° thick) with two gaps, 
one on the left and the other on the right side. The two gaps had different sizes, one large 
(0.6°) and one small (0.3°). Depending on the cue-reward contingency, the cue could 
have one of three equiluminant (28 cd/m2) colors: green, red or cyan. The cue appeared 
in a random angular position on an imaginary circle with a radius of 5° from the center 
of the screen (see Figure 2, panel a). A fixation cross, inscribed in a circle with 0.5° 
diameter, appeared in the center of the screen. The background luminance was set at 13 
cd/m2. Reward delivery was accompanied by the on-screen simulation of a liquid 
dropping into a glass. 
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Visual Search 
The stimuli consisted of two Ls and one T (1.8° x 1.8°), which appeared randomly 
tilted to the left or to the right, each one inside a colored ring used as reward cue during 
the conditioning phase (see Figure 2, panel b). The three compound stimuli were 
presented simultaneously and equally spaced (120°) on an imaginary circle (5° radius) 
centered on the screen. A fixation cross, inscribed in a circle with 0.5° diameter, 
appeared in the center of the screen. 
 
 
Figure 2. A schematic representation of the experimental procedure of Experiment 
1. 
(a) Conditioning task. (b) Visual search task. 
 
Procedure 
Participants’ level of thirst was assessed verbally at the beginning of the 
experiment. To increase the level of thirst, participants were offered salty food that 
could be eaten at pleasure. They were also shown a variety of fresh beverages (from 
water to well-known sugary drinks) and were asked to select their preferred one as 
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reward. The amount of liquid reward that dropped into the glass depended on their 
responses during the conditioning phase. Before starting the experiment, participants 
performed a few practice trials using a gray cue with the 0.5 cue-reward contingency. 
The experiment was divided into two phases, and overall lasted about 50 min. 
Participants were allowed to drink only at the end of the experiment. 
Conditioning 
Each trial started with a central fixation cross presented for 1000 ms, then the 
cue appeared for 300 ms. Participants’ task was to detect the side (left vs. right) of the 
larger gap in the ring by pressing the right or left arrow on the computer keyboard. 
Participants were informed that each color was associated with a different reward 
probability and that the number of trials in which a response could be provided was less 
than the total number of trials. Therefore, they had to decide how to distribute their 
response as a function of the cue’s color in order to maximize the amount of reward 
(Figure 2). They were also informed that the task could end early if all the available 
responses were used. However, both the total number of trials in the experiment (300) 
and the number of available responses (200) were unknown to the participants, who 
were also not informed about the three cue-reward contingencies. For each participant, 
the reward probability associated with a given color was randomly determined. In this 
way, I prevented participants from using the strategy of responding indifferently to all 
the cues. By contrast, the most effective strategy was to differentiate the response rates 
between the cues. After the cue appearance, participants had 1300 ms to respond. When 
delivered, the liquid dropped into a glass (see Figure 2 for details). 
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After completion of the two conditioning blocks, participants were asked to 
assess the cue-reward contingencies on a 10-point scale, with 0 meaning that the reward 
“never” followed the cue, and 9 that it “always” did. 
Visual search 
Participants performed a visual search task immediately after the conditioning 
phase. Each trial started with the appearance of a fixation cross for 1000 ms, and then 
the search display appeared for 700 ms. Participants had to report the orientation of the 
target letter as quickly as possible (see Figure 2 panel b). A minimal accuracy of 70% 
was required for obtaining the amount of beverage accumulated during the conditioning 
task. Participants were informed that no reward was delivered during this task and that 
the color of the previous reward cue stimuli was not predictive of the target location. 
Although their gaze was not controlled, participants were instructed to keep their eyes 
on the fixation cross during the task. From the onset of the display, the maximum time 
allowed for responding was 1700 ms, whereas the inter-trial interval was 1000 ms. 
Error feedback was provided. The visual search consisted of 180 trials, divided into 2 
blocks of 90 trials. The target appeared within each colored ring in an equal number of 
trials. 
RESULTS 
All participants reported to be thirsty at the beginning of the experiment. I tested 
two contrasting hypotheses about the capacity of reward-predicting cues to capture 
attention. According to the “uncertainty hypothesis”, response times (RTs) in the visual 
search task should be represented by a U-shaped function, with the minimum RT 
corresponding to the maximum level of uncertainty (.5). By contrast, the “expectancy 
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hypothesis” would predict a decreasing trend in RTs as a function of increasing 
stimulus-reward contingencies (Figure 3 panel a). In this and the following experiments, 
outliers (here <2% of the correct trials) were identified and excluded from the analysis 
using the procedure suggested by Cousineau (2010). Because it has been shown that the 
awareness of the cue-outcome relation is critical for the expression of learned behavior 
in human conditioning studies (Hogarth et al., 2008; Lovibond, 2003; Lovibond & 
Shanks, 2002), I analyzed participant’s assessments of the cue-reward contingency. 
Participants ranking the cue-reward contingency in the right order, namely p = .2 cue < p 
= .5 cue < p = .8 cue, were classified as “aware” (n = 22), and the remaining participants 
as “unaware” (n = 8). I shall refer to this division method as the “correct ranking 
criterion”. I performed a repeated measures ANOVA on visual search RTs for correct 
responses (overall accuracy in detecting target orientation was 87.3%) including all (n = 
30) participants with Contingency (.2, .5, and .8) as a within-subject factor and Group 
(aware and unaware) as a between subject factor. Results showed a significant 
interaction between Contingency and Group F(2, 56) = 4.25, p = .019, ηp
2  = .132, and no 
significant main effects of Contingency and Group (p = .146 and p = .315 respectively). I 
then focused the analysis on the group of “aware” participants. The accuracy in detecting 
target orientation for the remaining participants (n = 22) was 86.6%. A one-way 
repeated measures ANOVA on visual search RTs showed a significant main effect of 
Contingency (.2, .5, and .8), F(2, 42) = 8.79, p = .001, ηp
2  = .295. Data significantly fitted a 
linear trend, F(1, 21) = 12.11, p = .002, ηp
2  = .366, but not a quadratic trend (p = .434), 
thus favoring the “expectancy hypothesis” (Figure 3 panel c). Pairwise comparisons 
(one-tailed t test) showed that RTs in the p = .8 condition were significantly shorter than 
RTs in the p = .5 and p = .2 conditions, t(21) = 2.59, p = .017, d = 0.552, and t(21) = 3.48, p 
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= .002, d = 0.741 respectively. As shown in Figure 3 panel a, this RT-pattern is consisted 
only with the “expectancy hypothesis”. 
 
 
Figure 3. Hypothesis and results of Experiment 1 and 2. 
(a) Theoretical RT-pattern predicted by the “expectancy hypothesis” and 
“uncertainty hypothesis”. While the “expectancy hypothesis” predicts decreasing 
RTs with increasing contingency, the “uncertainty hypothesis” predicts a U-shaped 
trend, with similar RTs at the extremes and shorter RTs at maximal uncertainty (.5). 
(b) Visual search RTs in Experiment 1 plotted as a function of cue-reward 
contingencies. (c) Visual search RTs in Experiment 2 plotted as a function of cue-
reward contingencies. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals for within-
subjects designs (Cousineau, 2005). 
 
I analyzed the accuracy in the visual search task, also for detecting possible 
speed-accuracy trade off effects. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA on visual search 
accuracy showed a significant main effect of Contingency (.2, .5, and .8), F(2, 42) = 3.63, p 
= .035, ηp
2  = .147. Data significantly fitted a linear trend, F(1, 21) = 111.36, p = .011, ηp
2  = 
.271, indicating that during the test phase participants were more accurate at 
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responding to targets enclosed in the cues associated to the highest probability of 
reward. In other words, participants in the test phase were both faster and more 
accurate in responding to targets enclosed to cues as a function of the cue-reward 
contingency. 
I also analyzed the RTs for correct responses during conditioning, as the speed of 
responding to a reward cue has been shown to be a good index of conditioning (Pool et 
al., 2014; Talmi, Seymour, Dayan, & Dolan, 2008). The overall accuracy during the 
conditioning phase for the “aware” participants was 98.5% and outliers were less than 
2%. RTs were entered into a one-way repeated measures ANOVA with the same factor 
as before, which revealed a main effect of Contingency F(2, 42) = 21.92, p < .001, ηp
2  = 
.511. Data significantly fitted a linear trend, F(1, 21) = 33.49, p < .001, ηp
2  = .615, thus 
indicating that during the conditioning phase participants were faster at responding to 
cues associated to the highest probability of reward (see Figure 6, panel c). 
I also analyzed the rate of instrumental responses associated with the different 
colors. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA showed a significant main effect of 
Contingency (.2, .5, and .8), F(1.41, 29.66) = 65.87, p < .001, ηp
2  = .758 (Greenhouse-
Geisser corrected). Data significantly fitted a linear trend, F(1, 21) = 86.99, p < .001, ηp
2  = 
.806, indicating that participants responses increased with the cue-reward contingency. 
Poorly conditioned vs. highly conditioned: 
a conditioning level criterion 
Because it seems reasonable to expect that the attentional bias towards a 
conditioned stimulus depends on the level of conditioning that has been acquired, I used 
this information to define two subgroups from the whole n = 30 participants: highly 
conditioned and poorly conditioned, divided by a “conditioning level criterion”. To 
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obtain an index of conditioning, I analyzed the rate of instrumental responses associated 
with the different colors. Intuitively, the degree of conditioning increases as the 
difference between the response rates increases. Therefore, I computed the response 
rate for each participant and each color by dividing the number of responses given to a 
specific color by the total number of available responses for that color. I then calculated 
the difference between the two extreme rates as follows: 
ΔRATE = RR0.8 – RR0.2 
where RR0.8 and RR0.2 were the response rates for the color associated with 0.8 and 0.2 
contingency respectively. Moreover, to obtain an index of conditioning awareness I 
analyzed how each participant assessed the cue-reward contingencies. I defined 
ΔAWARENESS as the discrepancy between the observed ratings and the theoretical values: 
ΔAWARENESS = |T0.2 – O0.2|+ |T0.5 – O0.5| + |T0.8 – O0.8| 
where T and O were the theoretical and the observed values for color-associated 
contingencies respectively. By definition, the lower is the ΔAWARENESS, the higher is the 
participant’s degree of knowledge about the reward contingencies, and consequently the 
higher is the probability of observing a robust conditioning. To summarize, the amount 
of conditioning increases as ΔRATE increases, but decreases as ΔAWARENESS increases. The 
opposite trends of ΔRATE and ΔAWARENESS were corroborated by a significant negative 
correlation between the two indices (Pearson’s r(30) = -.485, p = .007, see Figure 5 panel 
a). 
An index of the attentional bias for each participant was calculated as follows: 
ΔRT = (MRT0.8 - MRT0.2) 
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where MRT0.8 and MRT0.2 were the mean RTs for the color associated with 0.8 and 0.2 
contingency respectively. As expected, this value correlated negatively with ΔRATE r(30) 
=-.381, p =.038, indicating that the more participants differentiated their responses 
during the conditioning, the larger the attentional bias for colors in visual search (Figure 
4, panel a). Moreover, ΔRT correlated positively with ΔAWARENESS, r(30) =.465, p =.010, 
indicating that the more a participant understood the color-contingency relation, the 
stronger the impact of the cues’ color on visual search (Figure 4, panel b). 
 
 
Figure 4. Correlations between conditioning variables in Experiment 1. 
(a) Correlation between ΔRATE and ΔRT. The correlation shows that the larger the 
degree of conditioning (high values of ΔRATE), the stronger the attentional bias in 
favor of the best reward-predicting cue (negative values of ΔRT). A value of ΔRT = 0 
indicates a lack of attentional bias according to the expectancy hypothesis. (b) 
Correlation between ΔAWARENESS and ΔRT. The correlation shows that the more 
participants were aware of the cue-reward contingency (low values of ΔAWARENESS), 
the more they paid attention to the best reward-predicting cue (negative values of 
ΔRT). Regression lines are showed. 
 
As suggested by these correlations, I combined ΔRATE and ΔAWARENESS to define the 
conditioning level criterion for dividing participants into two groups, depending on the 
 27 
level of conditioning. First, I ranked participants in ascending order according to ΔRATE, 
and then I plotted ΔAWARENESS and ΔRATE together on the same graph (Figure 5, panel b). 
Because of their negative correlation, the regression lines of ΔRATE and ΔAWARENESS 
crossed each other, and the point of intersection (corresponding to ΔRATE = 34%) was 
taken as a criterion for defining two groups: highly conditioned (ΔRATE > 34%, n = 19) 
and poorly conditioned (ΔRATE < 34%, n = 11). 
 
 
Figure 5. Correlation and conditioning level division criterion in Experiment 1. 
(a) Correlation between ΔRATE and ΔAWARENESS. High values of ΔRATE reflect a markedly 
different response behavior for the cues during the conditioning phase. Low values 
of ΔAWARENESS indicate that the participants’ ratings of the cue-contingency 
association were accurate. Regression line is showed. (b) Conditioning level 
criterion. ΔRATE and ΔAWARENESS are plotted together, with ΔRATE ranked in ascending 
order. Regression line and fitting value are shown for each series. The point of 
intersection of the two regression lines (corresponding to ΔRATE = 34%) was used to 
divide participants into two groups: the highly conditioned (on the right; n = 19) and 
the poorly conditioned (on the left; n = 11). 
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Response rates were entered into an ANOVA with Contingency (0.2, 0.5, and 0.8) 
as within-subject factor, and Group (highly conditioned vs. poorly conditioned) as 
between-subject factor. The main effect of Contingency F(1.475,41.3) = 66.4, p <.001, ηp
2  
=.703, Group F(1,28) = 7.74, p =.010, ηp
2  =.217, and their interaction F(1.475,41.3) = 21.4, 
p <.001, ηp
2  =.433 (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected), were all significant. As shown in 
Figure 6 panel f, the cue-reward contingency had a larger impact on the response rate of 
the highly-conditioned group. 
For a validation of the conditioning level criterion, I analyzed conditioning RTs 
for the correct responses (overall accuracy was 98.7% and outliers less than 2%). An 
ANOVA on RTs with the same factors as before revealed a significant main effect of 
Contingency F(2, 56) = 15.2, p <.001, ηp
2  =.351, and a significant Contingency x Group 
interaction F(2, 56) = 14.0, p <.001, ηp
2  =.334. As depicted in Figure 6, panel d, RTs 
differed as a function of cue-reward contingency only in the group of highly-conditioned 
participants F(2,36) = 32.4, p <.001, ηp
2  =.643. 
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Figure 6. Graphical representation of the results of Experiment 1 as a function of 
division criteria. 
(a) Visual search RTs in Experiment 1 across groups as defined by correct ranking 
criterion and cue-outcome contingencies. (b) Visual search RTs in Experiment 1 
across groups as defined by conditioning level criterion and cue-outcome 
contingencies. (c) RTs during conditioning in Experiment 1 across groups as defined 
by correct ranking criterion and cue-outcome contingencies. (d) RTs during 
conditioning in Experiment 1 across groups as defined by conditioning level 
criterion and cue-outcome contingencies. (e) Response rates during conditioning in 
Experiment 1 across groups as defined by correct ranking criterion and cue-
outcome contingencies. (f) Response rates during conditioning in Experiment 1 
across groups as defined by conditioning level criterion and cue-outcome 
contingencies. Error bars represent the 95% confidence intervals for within-
subjects designs (Cousineau, 2005). 
 
Finally, I analyzed again the RTs in the visual search task considering also the 
between-factor Group. An ANOVA on RTs revealed a significant Contingency x Group 
interaction F(2, 56) = 6.32, p = .003, ηp
2  = .184. Post hoc analyses showed that the effect 
of Contingency was significant in the highly conditioned group F(2, 36) = 11.41, p < .001, 
ηp
2  = .388, but not in the poorly conditioned group (p =.489; Figure 6, panel b). Notably, 
the data that most contributed to the effect (highly conditioned group) strongly 
confirmed the “expectancy hypothesis”. The linear fit was significant F(1, 18) = 16.59, p 
= .001, ηp
2  = .430, whereas the quadratic fit was not significant (p =.196). 
DISCUSSION 
The results from the visual search task indicate that expectancy is the major 
factor controlling the attentional salience of the reward cue when the reward-prediction 
error is not nil. According to my interpretation, such attentional bias would result from a 
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change in the cues’ attentional salience caused by the different levels of reward 
expectancy. 
As already reported in the literature (Hogarth et al., 2008), participants that were 
highly inaccurate in rating the cue-reward contingencies showed no attentional bias 
during the test phase. Accordingly, I have found that only participants who ranked the 
cue-reward contingency in the right order (aware participants) showed evidence of 
capture in the visual search task. Moreover, additional evidence emerges with a deeper 
investigation of the level of conditioning that participants had developed. Indeed, highly 
and poorly conditioned participants were separated more finely by adopting a 
conditioning level criterion that took into account both the participant’s response rate 
and the reported awareness of the cue-reward contingency. The goodness of the 
splitting criterion was confirmed by the fact that the two groups of participants (highly 
vs. poorly conditioned) showed also different conditioning RTs. As already documented 
by previous studies (Pool et al., 2014; Talmi et al., 2008), in the highly conditioned group 
RTs decreased as contingency increased, whereas no difference emerged in the poorly 
conditioned group. Although conditioning can take place even for subliminal cues 
(Knight, Nguyen, & Bandettini, 2003; Mastropasqua & Turatto, 2015; Pessiglione et al., 
2008; but see Shanks, 2010), the significant correlation between the magnitude of 
capture elicited by the cue (ΔRT) and the awareness of the cue-reward contingency 
(ΔAWARENESS) might indicate that the latter information (awareness) could be relevant for 
the development of an attentional bias toward the conditioned stimulus. 
The attentional bias I have reported is in line with other studies suggesting that 
attention is captured by stimuli that formerly predicted a motivational outcome. 
Alternatively, however, because in Experiment 1 the three cues elicited different 
probabilities of instrumental responses during the conditioning phase, one might argue 
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that the cues differed in terms of selection history (Awh et al., 2012), which in turns 
determined the attentional bias in the testing phase. If by “selection” we mean the act of 
attending the cue, then the different rate of responses given to each cue does not 
necessarily imply that the cues had a different selection history. Indeed, one may note 
that all cues needed to be strategically attended, as participants had to carefully decide 
how to distribute the limited number of responses available. Thus, from this perspective 
all cues had to be attended comparably. 
However, if by “selection” we mean the instrumental action of responding to a 
certain cue (Chapman et al., 2014), then it can be argued that the different response rate 
associated to each cue was the major determinant of the subsequent attentional bias 
found in the visual search task. 
To ascertain whether the selection history account could explain the results of 
Experiment 1, a second experiment was conducted in which the cues were equalized in 
terms of rate of responding during the conditioning phase, by requiring an instrumental 
response on each trial. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
METHODS 
Participants 
Twenty-two undergraduate students (Mage = 19.1 years, 17 females) took part in 
the experiment after providing informed consent. They were asked not to drink for 
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about 4 hours prior to the experimental session. They received €5 compensation for 
their participation. 
Apparatus 
As in Experiment 1. 
Stimuli 
As in Experiment 1, except that the three colored rings, which served as cues in 
the conditioning phase and as irrelevant stimuli in the visual search task, had no gaps 
along the circumference. 
Procedure 
As in Experiment 1, except that during the conditioning phase, on each trial, the 
participant’s task was to either “accept” or “reject” the cue by pressing the “m” or the “x” 
key of the keyboard respectively. If participants decided to “accept” the cue, they gained 
the possibility of receiving the liquid reward, as a function of the cue-reward probability. 
However, whether or not they received the reward, as in Experiment 1, participants had 
a limited number of “accept” responses available. On the other hand, if participants 
decided to “reject” the cue, they had no chance of receiving the liquid reward and the 
number of available responses remained unvaried. In this way, not only the cues were 
equally attended, but they were also identical in terms of responses required, which 
implies that they had the same selection history. 
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RESULTS 
All participants reported to be thirsty at the beginning of the experiment. Three 
participants were excluded from the analysis because their accuracy in the visual search 
task was less than 75%. The two criteria of division adopted in Experiment 1, namely 
the “correct ranking” and the “level of conditioning” criteria, have produced similar 
results. Therefore, in this and the following experiments I adopted the simplest correct 
ranking criterion. I then classified participants as “aware” and “unaware” applying the 
same correct ranking criterion of Experiment 1 (correct ranking). I performed a 
repeated measures ANOVA on visual search RTs for correct responses (overall accuracy 
in detecting target orientation was 89.8%) including all (n = 19) participants with 
Contingency (.2, .5, and .8) as a within-subject factor and Group (aware and unaware) as 
a between subject factor. Results showed a significant interaction between Contingency 
and Group F(2, 34) = 8.24, p = .001, ηp
2  = .327, and no significant main effects of 
Contingency and Group (p = .248 and p = .292 respectively). I therefore focused the 
analysis on the group of “aware” participants (n = 15). The accuracy in detecting target 
orientation for the remaining participants in the visual search task was 89.7% and 
outliers resulted in less than 2% of the correct trials. A one-way repeated measures 
ANOVA showed a significant main effect of Contingency (.2, .5, and .8), F(2, 28) = 5.30, p 
= .011, ηp
2  = .275. Data significantly fitted a linear trend, F(1, 14) = 7.81, p = .014, ηp
2  = 
.358, but not a quadratic trend (p = .479), thus favoring again the “expectancy 
hypothesis” (Figure 3 panel c). Pairwise comparisons (one-tailed t test) showed that RTs 
in the p = .8 condition were shorter than RTs in the p = .2 condition, t(14) = 2.79, p = 
.007, d = 0.720, although they did not differ with RTs in the p = .5 condition (p = .142). 
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I then analyzed the RTs during conditioning, separately for “accept” and “reject” 
responses. Outliers (<2%) were treated as described before. For “accept” responses, a 
one-way repeated measures ANOVA with the same factors as before revealed a main 
effect of Contingency F(2, 28) = 11.13, p < .001, ηp
2  = .443. Data significantly fitted a 
linear trend, F(1, 14) = 21.65, p < .001, ηp
2  = .607, indicating that during the conditioning 
phase participants were faster at deciding to accept the cue associated to the highest 
probability of reward. Analogously, for “reject” responses, the analysis revealed a main 
effect of Contingency F(1.20, 16.80) = 6.40, p = .018, ηp
2  = .314 (Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrected). Again, data significantly fitted a linear trend, F(1, 14) = 7.72, p = .015, ηp
2  = 
.355, but with an opposite direction, indicating that during the conditioning phase 
participants were faster at rejecting the cue associated to the lowest probability of 
reward. 
Moreover, I analyzed the rate of responses of acceptance associated with the 
different colors. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA showed a significant main effect 
of Contingency (.2, .5, and .8), F(2, 28) = 49.00, p < .001, ηp
2  = .778. Data significantly 
fitted a linear trend, F(1, 14) = 110.7, p < .001, ηp
2  = .888, thus indicating that the rate of 
acceptance of a cue increased with its contingency, with the consequence that obviously 
the rate of refusal of a cue increased as its contingency decreased. 
DISCUSSION 
Experiment 2 was designed to explore whether the selection history hypothesis 
could account for the results of Experiment 1, where the three different cues were 
associated to different rates of responding. However, when the cues were made equal in 
terms of responses, namely in terms of their selection history, the attentional bias 
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toward the best reward predictor was still present in the visual search task. By ruling 
out the selection history hypothesis, this result replicated the one emerged in 
Experiment 1 and gave support to the possibility that the attentional bias was due to the 
different reward expectancy associated with the cues during the conditioning phase. 
However, because the p = .8 cue was accepted more often than the other cues, 
while the p = .2 cue was rejected more often than the other cues, one could argue that 
during conditioning this resulted in a tendency to develop an “approach” behavior 
toward the more “appetitive” p = .8 cue, and in a tendency to develop an “avoidance” 
behavior toward the less “appetitive” p = .2 cue. This putative approach vs. avoidance 
strategy would have reintroduced a difference in the selection history between the 
different reward cues, thus explaining the attentional bias found the visual search phase. 
However, because in Experiment 2 past selection differences were matched in both the 
attentional and the action domain, the potential influence of these tendencies must act at 
a conceptual level. 
In order to exclude any possible influence of selection history on attentional 
modulation, even at a conceptual level, another experiment was performed in which the 
cues were never task relevant (i.e. they were never selected in any possible way), not 
even during the conditioning phase. This was achieved by adapting an omission 
contingency paradigm already developed by Le Pelley and colleagues (Failing et al., 
2015; Le Pelley et al., 2015; Pearson et al., 2015). 
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EXPERIMENT 3 
METHODS 
Participants 
Twenty-six undergraduate students (Mage = 23.3 years, 19 females) took part in 
the experiment after providing informed consent. They were asked not to drink for 
about 4 hours prior to the experimental session. They received €5 compensation for 
their participation. 
Apparatus 
As in Experiment 1, but with the addition of an eye-tracking system (Eyelink 
1000 Tower Mount), with a sampling rate of 1000 Hz, end-to-end sample delay of M < 
1.8 ms, SD < .6 ms, and spatial resolution < .01° RMS. 
Stimuli 
Conditioning phase 
The cue appeared as part of an array of six equally spaced (60°) elements placed 
on an imaginary circle (4° radius) centered on the screen. The cue and four elements of 
the array were outlined rings (2° in diameter, 0.25° thick). The remaining element of the 
array was an outlined diamond (2.4° in diagonal, 0.25° thick). The location of the 
elements in the array was randomly determined trial by trial. Depending on the cue-
reward contingency, the cue could have one of three possible colors as in the previous 
experiments. The other elements of the array appeared in gray (4 cd/m2). The 
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background luminance was set at 13 cd/m2. Reward delivery was accompanied by the 
on-screen simulation of a liquid dropping into a glass. 
Visual Search 
As in Experiment 2, except that during the visual search display no fixation cross 
was present. 
 
 
Figure 7. A schematic representation of the experimental procedure of Experiment 
3. 
(a) Conditioning task. (b) Visual search task. 
 
Procedure 
Conditioning 
Each trial started with a central fixation cross presented for 1000 ms. Then the 
screen went blank for an interval of either 400 or 600 ms (randomly determined), after 
which the array of stimuli appeared. Participants’ task was to make a saccade as fast and 
accurate as possible toward the diamond. A region of interest was defined around the 
target diamond and around the cue, and corresponded to the dimensions of the 
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respective stimuli. Eye movements landing in these regions were controlled by means of 
the eye-tracking system. If participants made a saccade to the target, the reward was 
delivered according to the cue-associated probability, whereas no reward was delivered 
in case the saccade landed on the colored cue. In this way, an omission contingency 
procedure was implemented (see Figure 7 for details). Participants were not informed 
about the three cue-reward contingencies (.2, .5 or .8). For each participant, the reward 
probability associated with a given color was randomly determined. When delivered, the 
liquid reward dropped into a glass as in the previous experiments. 
After completion of two conditioning blocks, in which a total number of 210 trials 
were equally divided between blocks and between the three cues, participants were 
asked to assess the cue-reward contingencies as in the previous experiments. 
Visual search 
As in Experiment 2, but with the following exceptions. First, a region of interest, 
controlled by the eye-tracker, was defined for each of the three letters, and consisted of 
the area covered by the ring in which the letter was embedded. Second, no fixation cross 
was present during the display of the three compound stimuli and participants were not 
instructed to keep their gaze on the center of the screen. Third, the time allowed for 
responding was set as 3 s, after which the response was considered as an error and the 
task continued with the next trial. Fourth, the compound stimuli were placed on an 
imaginary circle with 4° diameter centered on the screen. 
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RESULTS 
All participants reported to be thirsty at the beginning of the experiment. I 
classified participants as “aware” and “unaware” applying the same “correct ranking” 
criterion of previous experiments. I performed a repeated measures ANOVA on visual 
search RTs for correct responses (overall accuracy in detecting target orientation was 
98.2%) including all twenty-six participants with Contingency (.2, .5, and .8) as a within-
subject factor and Group (aware and unaware) as a between subject factor. Results 
showed a significant interaction between Contingency and Group F(2, 48) = 4.54, p = 
.016, ηp
2  = .159, and no significant main effects of Contingency and Group (p = .328 and p 
= .419 respectively). I therefore focused the analysis on the group of “aware” 
participants (n = 18). The accuracy in detecting the target orientation for the remaining 
participants was 98.3%, and the outliers were less than 2% of the total RTs. A one-way 
repeated measures ANOVA on RTs in the visual search task showed a significant main 
effect of Contingency (.2, .5, and .8), F(2, 34) = 5.88, p = .006, ηp
2  = .257. Data significantly 
fitted a linear trend, F(1, 17) = 13.48, p = .002, ηp
2  = .442, but not a quadratic trend (p = 
.714), thus favoring again the “expectancy hypothesis” (Figure 8 panel a). Pairwise 
comparisons (one-tailed t test) showed that RTs in the p = .8 condition were significantly 
shorter than RTs in the p = .5 and p = .2 conditions, t(17) = 1.84, p = .042, d = 0.434, and 
t(17) = 3.67, p = .001, d = 0.865 respectively. 
I also analyzed the first saccade directed toward a region of interest during the 
visual search task. In the 88% of the trials, this saccade was either the first or the second 
saccade from the onset of the visual search display. I calculated the percentage of the 
first saccades landing on the region of interest as a function of the former cue-reward 
probability. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA showed a significant main effect of 
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Contingency (.2, .5, .8), F(2, 34) = 6.86, p = .003, ηp
2  = .288. Data significantly fitted a 
linear trend, F(1, 17) = 10.94, p = .004, ηp
2  = .392, indicating that the percentage of the 
first saccades directed toward the cues was directly related to the previous cue-reward 
contingency (Figure 8 panel b). 
Moreover, I analyzed the oculomotor capture triggered by the cue during the 
conditioning phase (i.e. omission trials). I calculated the percentage of saccades toward 
the cue for each of the three cue-reward probabilities. Because it seems reasonable to 
assume that the influence of the cues’ value would emerge only after participants 
learned the cue-reward contingencies, I assessed how the percentages of saccades 
toward the cues varied as a function of training. To this aim, I divided the whole set of 
trials in seven consecutive bins (each bin comprising 10 trials per condition). Data were 
entered into a repeated measures ANOVA with Contingency (.2, .5, and .8) and Training 
(bin 1-7) as within-subjects factors. No significant main effect of Contingency (p = .056) 
and Training (p = .059), as well as their interaction (p = .949) emerged (see Figure 8 
panel c). 
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Figure 8. Graphical representation of the results of Experiment 3. 
(a) Visual search RTs in Experiment 3 plotted as a function of the previous cue-
reward contingencies. (b) Percentage of first saccade directed toward a cue during 
visual search as a function of the previous cue-reward contingencies. (c) Percentage 
of omission trials during the conditioning phase in Experiment 3 plotted as a 
function of the cue-reward contingencies and training (left panel), and as a function 
of contingency (right panel). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals for 
within-subjects designs (Cousineau, 2005). 
 
DISCUSSION 
By using a hybrid procedure consisting of a conditioning phase in which the 
reward cues were task irrelevant, and a separated test phase in which the cues were 
devoid of any reward value, Experiment 3 provided further and more robust evidence in 
favor of the expectancy hypothesis. Not only were participants faster in detecting the 
target when it was encircled in the highest predictive cue, but they were also more 
prone to make their first saccade towards the same cue, thus confirming that reward 
stimuli affect human’s oculomotor behavior (Hickey & Van Zoest, 2012). 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION  
The aim of the preset chapter was to investigate whether the attentional salience 
of a reward cue is more affected by reward expectancy or by reward uncertainty. 
Stemming from a long-lasting debate on this issue, and in light of the link between 
reward based associative learning and attention, the main question was whether an 
attention modulation by reward uncertainty could emerge in contexts in which 
uncertainty is not nil, namely when the cues are still associated with a reward-
prediction error. With this goal in mind, the cue-reward contingency was manipulated 
while maintaining a degree of uncertainty for all levels of reward expectancy. 
The RT-pattern that emerged in the visual search task of Experiments 1, 2 and 3, 
indicates that when the reward prediction error is not zero, expectancy is the major 
factor controlling the attentional salience of the reward cue, as proposed by Mackintosh 
(1975). This result is in line with previous studies showing that attention is 
preferentially captured by cues associated with the outcome most likely to occur 
(Anderson et al., 2011; Failing et al., 2015; Mine & Saiki, 2015; Theeuwes & Belopolsky, 
2012). The results are also not inconsistent with previous studies showing that cues 
associated with the most uncertain outcome (p = .5) are more salient than cues 
predicting a reward that is certain (p = 1; Hogarth et al., 2008; M. J. F. Robinson et al., 
2014, 2015), likely because in these studies the cue with the highest probability was not 
associated with a reward prediction error (also see, Sali et al., 2014). 
Therefore, although a certain amount of reward uncertainty seems to be 
necessary for a cue to become an attentional attractor, the present results clearly 
indicate that reward expectancy weighs more than reward uncertainty in determining 
the attentional salience of the cue. However, both factors contribute to the salience of a 
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reward cue, as suggested by a model of attention in associative learning recently 
proposed by Esber and Haselgrove (2011). Furthermore, this view is further supported 
by behavioral and neural evidence (Beesley et al., 2015). From the brain activity point of 
view, it has been shown that reward expectancy and uncertainty elicit different 
dopaminergic activities in the primates’ ventral midbrain: the phasic response to 
conditioned stimuli increases monotonically with reward probability, while the 
sustained activity observed before the reward delivery is driven by uncertainty (Fiorillo, 
Tobler, & Schultz, 2003). Similarly, subcortical dopaminergic activity in humans 
correlates with both reward expectancy and uncertainty (Linnet et al., 2012; Preuschoff, 
Bossaerts, & Quartz, 2006). It can be argued that this differential encoding of reward 
variables could also signal the attentional system differently. 
It is worth noting that during the conditioning phase of Experiments 1 and 2 the 
reward cue was presented in isolation, and was not embedded among other distractors. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that participants were reinforced to search for the reward cue 
among distractors, which undermines the possibility that the attentional bias emerged 
in the test phase could be either a conditioned visual search response learned before, as 
it may have happened in previous studies (e.g. Anderson et al., 2011), or a trained search 
response learned irrespective of the role of reward (Sha & Jiang, 2015). In Experiment 3, 
I sought to provide a stronger evidence for a value-dependent attentional modulation, 
and to this aim I implemented a hybrid procedure exploiting both the irrelevancy of the 
cue during the conditioning phase (Failing et al., 2015; Le Pelley et al., 2015; Pearson et 
al., 2015) and the absence of reward informational value in a separate test phase 
(Anderson & Halpern, 2017). The attentional bias I documented in the present chapter is 
likely to be the result of a Pavlovian mechanism that operates by shifting the reward 
properties from the reward to the cue, an idea originally proposed by Bindra (1978) and 
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Toates (1986), and that is central in the more recent theory of incentive salience 
(Berridge & Robinson, 2016). 
Although Experiment 3 confirmed the results of Experiments 1 and 2 by adopting 
a different learning procedure, its conditioning phase did not fully replicate the results 
of experiments from which it took inspiration (Failing et al., 2015; Le Pelley et al., 2015; 
Pearson et al., 2015). Indeed, by implementing an omission contingency with three 
reward-uncertain cues, I failed to show that the most predictive cue elicited more 
counterproductive oculomotor capture. On the contrary, I found that participants 
tended to dwell erroneously more towards the less reward-associated cue. However, 
because of several procedural differences between the task adopted here and those of 
previous studies (Failing et al., 2015; Le Pelley et al., 2015; Pearson et al., 2015), a 
straightforward comparison is unwarranted. Still, the opposite tendency that I have 
reported here can have two important implications. On the one hand, if during 
conditioning participants erroneously had made more saccades toward the most 
valuable cue, then a selection history explanation could be invoked to interpret the 
attentional bias emerged in the visual search task. By contrast, participants tended to 
make more saccades towards the less valuable cue, which however did not affect the 
attentional effect emerged in the visual search task, a result that provides strong support 
for the expectancy hypothesis and that definitely rules out the selection history account. 
On the other hand, the oculomotor capture towards the less valuable cue is compelling 
and gives rise to additional questions about the relation, for example, between value-
modulated oculomotor effects and the attentional strategies in uncertain contexts 
(exploration vs exploitation). 
A concern might be raised regarding the appropriateness of the manipulation 
implemented here in light of a possible role of the expected value (EV), which is the 
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product of outcome probability and outcome magnitude. One could argue that the EV 
should be matched across cues in order to disentangle between the uncertainty and the 
expectancy hypotheses. By contrast, I manipulated the cue-outcome uncertainty by 
varying only the probability of the outcome and not its magnitude, as this seems 
particularly appropriate to study how the cue becomes attentionally salient. One should 
note, indeed, that according to both the theory of Mackintosh (1975) and the theory of 
Pearce & Hall (1980), if the EV is kept constant across different cues (which means that 
reward magnitude is inversely related to its probability), a good predictor of a small 
outcome would be salient as much as an uncertain predictor of a large outcome, because 
the outcome reliability of the cue in the former case would be compensated by a greater 
outcome magnitude in the latter. Thus, the cues would result equally salient, and 
therefore it would not be possible to distinguish between the two theories. For this 
reason, in previous studies addressing the role of the two theories the variation in 
outcome probability was not accompanied by a change in the outcome magnitude, thus 
the EV was not maintained constant across the cues (Beesley et al., 2015; Fiorillo et al., 
2003; Hogarth et al., 2008). 
In conclusion, the results of Experiment 1, 2 and 3 are in agreement with the 
theory of attention formulated by Mackintosh (1975) and show that reward delivery 
leads to robust attentional learning (Chelazzi et al., 2013), so that attention is 
preferentially allocated to the relatively best reward predicting cues available. The 
results are also in line with the possibility that if a cue is consistently paired with an 
incentive stimulus, the cue acquires some motivational properties of the incentive 
stimulus (Toates, 1986), and consequently captures attention. Thus, I interpret the 
attentional bias as a result of the associative strength between cues and reward, and 
promoted by the conditioning phase. Moreover, in agreement with Robinson and 
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Berridge (2008) I acknowledge the possibility that the attentional bias might be also 
interpreted as signature of the incentive salience acquired by the cue during 
conditioning, supporting the idea that good reward-predicting stimuli can become 
attentional magnets that attract the organism’s interest, even beyond the initial 
conditioning phase. 
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CHAPTER 3 
INSTRUMENTAL PERFORMANCE: 
THE PIT EFFECT 
In the preceding chapter, I investigated how neutral stimuli come to endow 
attentional properties when they are associated with motivationally significant 
outcomes. In particular, although a level of uncertainty in the relation between cues and 
outcome seems to trigger the attentional modulation, the major factor controlling the 
cue attentional capture is the outcome expectancy, or how reliable is the information 
provided by a cue about its motivational consequences. 
THE PAVLOVIAN-INSTRUMENTAL TRANSFER EFFECT 
Besides exerting an effect on the attentional system, conditioning and other 
learning mechanisms play a fundamental role in determining the organism consumption 
of food and other substances. Reward cues acquire also the power to enhance 
instrumental actions performed in order to obtain the associated outcome. Within this 
area of research, the motivational properties of the conditioned stimuli are made 
manifest by the Pavlovian-Instrumental transfer (PIT) effect, a phenomenon that 
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provides a clear example of how reward cues can influence behavior. In the PIT, two 
separate associative learning processes interact - Pavlovian and Instrumental 
conditioning – resulting in the influence of Pavlovian CSs on instrumental actions. This 
effect can be valued employing a Pavlovian conditioning, an instrumental conditioning, 
and a test in which the two are combined. During the Pavlovian conditioning the agent is 
exposed to a contingency between a conditioned stimulus (CS or Pavlovian cue; e.g. a 
sound or a visual stimulus) and an outcome, whereas during the instrumental 
conditioning the outcome is associated with an action performed by the agent 
(instrumental action; e.g. lever pressing). Although the PIT has been traditionally and 
extensively studied in animals, it has recently been observed also in humans (for a 
review and a meta analysis see Cartoni, Balleine, & Baldassarre, 2016; Holmes, 
Marchand, & Coutureau, 2010). 
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PHENOMENON  
The PIT effect has been initially attributed to a general motivating drive-like 
influence on the instrumental performance caused by the CS. It can be argued, indeed, 
that via a trained association the cue is capable to trigger an instrumental action.. 
However, this argument cannot account for the PIT effect because the CS and the 
instrumental actions are learned during separate trainings, and therefore the 
incentivizing effect of the CS on the instrumental action cannot be explained by an 
existing association between the CS and the rewarded action. Subsequently, it was 
observed that the CS exerts its influence selectively on the instrumental action 
associated with the same outcome, and not with an action associated to a different 
outcome (specific PIT). Thus, the motivation triggered by the CS must be considered 
outcome-specific. By these means, the CS would activate the outcome representation, 
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which in turn promotes the instrumental action through an association learned during 
the instrumental conditioning phase (Balleine & Ostlund, 2007). However, Corbit, Janak, 
and Balleine, (2007) provided evidence that a third CS associated with an outcome that 
has not been used in instrumental training, can generally influence the instrumental 
responding trained with different outcomes (general PIT). These results are consistent 
with the argument that Pavlovian CSs generate a general excitatory state that can 
motivate and increase instrumental actions (Dickinson & Balleine, 2002). In agreement 
with this view, PIT has been interpreted as a measure of the CS motivational property or 
incentive salience (Berridge, 2001; Berridge & Robinson, 2003). 
In this chapter, I will examine the PIT effect in human subjects. According with 
the incentive-sensitization theory, I aimed at testing that CSs not only influence the 
attention an organism deploys to them, but also affect the effort one is willing to spend 
in order to obtain an associated outcome. 
I therefore tested human participants in a PIT paradigm in Experiment 4. Thirsty 
participants first learned to squeeze a rubber bulb to gain a liquid reward. Then, they 
underwent a Pavlovian conditioning in which three CSs were paired with different levels 
of liquid delivery, according to a predefined probabilistic schedule. Finally, participants 
were tested for PIT: they performed the instrumental action learned in the first phase in 
the presence of one of the three possible CSs. The guiding hypothesis was that the 
strength of the PIT effect would be proportional to the CS-US contingency: p = .2, p = .5 
and p = .8. In other words, resembling the attentional results emerged in Chapter 2, the 
performance triggered by the CS should be greater for a CS that is a highly reliable 
predictor of the US (i.e., p = .8) as compared to a CS that predicted the US with a low 
probability (i.e., p = .2). Note that in a standard PIT paradigm the PIT effect emerges as 
an incremental rate of instrumental responding in the presence of the CS previously 
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associated with the reward (e.g., p = 1 or .8) as compared to a baseline condition in 
which either no CS or a CS that was never paired with the reward is presented (p = 0). 
Since in the following experiment I used three CS with three different levels of 
contingency, a differential instrumental responding between the three CS in the PIT 
phase must be taken as evidence of the PIT effect. In other words, the rate of 
instrumental responding with the CS associated with the lowest contingency (p = .2) 
served as baseline for the PIT effect. Mean pressure, peak pressure and the number of 
grips acquired by means of the rubber bulb were taken as dependent measures of 
instrumental action. 
Participants were free to choose their preferred liquid US (plain water or well-
known sugary beverages). The importance of the choice will emerge in the following 
chapter. Here, I anticipate the assumption that plain water is not necessarily an intrinsic 
desirable stimulus, namely that its desirability is proportional to the organism’s level of 
thirst. By contrast, sugary beverages can be examined in light of the addictive-like 
properties of sugar (Avena & Hoebel, 2003; Schulte, Avena, & Gearhardt, 2015; Stouffer 
et al., 2015). 
The scope of the following experiment is twofold. First, to support the not so 
conspicuous existing evidence of the PIT effect in humans, also adding additional 
information by modulating the cue-outcome relation in terms of outcome predictability. 
Second, to create a reliable setting that could be adopted for a further manipulation 
described in the following chapter. 
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EXPERIMENT 4 
METHODS 
Participants 
Thirty undergraduate students (Mage = 22.6 years, 18 females) took part in the 
experiment after providing informed consent. They were asked not to drink for about 4 
hours prior to the experimental session. The experiment was carried out in accordance 
with the Declaration of Helsinki, and with the approval of the local research Ethics 
Committee (Comitato per la sperimentazione sull’essere umano dell’Università di 
Trento). 
Apparatus 
Participants were seated in a dimly illuminated room at a distance of 60 cm from 
the monitor (1920x1080 resolution, 100 Hz). The generation and presentation of the 
stimuli was controlled by using Matlab and Psychtoolbox-3 (Pelli, 1997), running on 
Windows 7. A rubber bulb was given to participant’s non dominant hand. The rubber 
bulb was identical in shape, dimensions, material and physical resistance to a common 
bulb used for blood pressure measurements. The pressure generated by the squeeze of 
the bulb was read in Volts by means of a linear transformation applied by a gas pressure 
sensor (Vernier GPS-BTA). The output of the sensor (Volt) was acquired by a measure 
and control device (National Instruments myDAQ), sent to the computer and recorded 
by Matlab at 10-Hz sampling rate (see Figure 9Figure 9. Detail of the rubber bulb, gas 
pressure sensor and control device adopted in Experiment 4.). A liquid delivery 
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apparatus was placed on the right side of the monitor and was triggered by the 
computer. Each delivery consisted of 2 ml of liquid dropping into a visible cup. 
 
 
Figure 9. Detail of the rubber bulb, gas pressure sensor and control device adopted 
in Experiment 4. 
 
Stimuli 
First phase: instrumental conditioning 
The drawing of a vertical mercury-like bar outlined in black was presented at the 
center of the screen. The overall dimension of the bar filled 75% of the total height of the 
screen and was 2° wide, with a 4° diameter ball at the bottom (see Figure 10). In 
addition, the bar was filled in dark yellow with a level that dynamically changed as a 
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function of the pressure exerted by participants on the rubber bulb. The minimum 
pressure level reached the half of the bar, while the maximum pressure level filled the 
bar almost completely. Additionally, two mirrored black arrows pointing on the sides of 
the bar served as indicators of the minimal pressure required (see following procedure) 
and were positioned in height at the proper level. The arrows changed their color to 
dark yellow when the acquired pressure level exceeded it. The gray background 
luminance was set at 13 cd/m2. Reward delivery was accompanied by the on-screen 
simulation of a liquid dropping into a glass. 
Second phase: Pavlovian conditioning 
Each CS was an outlined colored ring (2° in diameter, 0.25° thick). The CS could 
have one of three equiluminant (28 cd/m2) colors: green, red or cyan, depending on the 
CS-US probability. The CS appeared in a random angular position on an imaginary circle 
with a radius of 5° from the center of the screen. Each CS was accompanied by an 
associated sound. The sounds were three sinusoidal waves with the frequency of 196, 
329 or 784 Hz (corresponding to G3, E4 and G5 respectively) played at a comfortable 
amplitude. The gray background luminance was set at 13 cd/m2. Reward delivery was 
accompanied by the on-screen simulation of a liquid dropping into a glass. 
PIT 
The mercury-like bar appeared at the same position as the first phase. In 
addition, one of the CSs appeared in a random angular position on an imaginary circle 
with a radius of 5° from the center of the screen, but it was never superimposed on the 
bar. Each CS was accompanied by its associated sound. The gray background luminance 
was set at 13 cd/m2. 
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Procedure 
The procedure adopted in the present study is similar to other procedures used 
in previous human PIT studies (e.g. Pool, Brosch, Delplanque, & Sander, 2015; Talmi et 
al., 2008), and was adapted from them. Participants’ level of thirst was assessed verbally 
at the beginning of the experiment. Participants were also offered salty food to increase 
their level of thirst. They were asked to choose their preferred beverage (water or other 
well-known sugary drinks) that served as reward, and that would have been consumed 
later. Before starting the experiment, participants performed a few practice trials for the 
first phase only. The experiment was divided into three phases, and overall lasted about 
45 min. The instrumental training was administered first, and then participants 
underwent a Pavlovian conditioning. The first phase was relatively short for two 
reasons: firstly, I wanted to minimize the possibility for instrumental response to 
become habitual, and secondly because a long instrumental training is detrimental when 
it precedes Pavlovian conditioning (Holmes et al., 2010). Lastly, participants were tested 
in a PIT procedure. Participants were allowed to drink the beverage they earned during 
the instrumental and Pavlovian conditioning phases only at the end of the experiment. 
First phase: instrumental conditioning 
Each trial started with a central fixation cross presented for 1000 ms. Then, the 
mercury-like bar appeared and remained on the screen for 10 s. The appearance of the 
bar was signaled by a brief “gong” sound. Participants were instructed that during the 
display of the mercury-like bar there were three secret time windows during which if 
the pressure level signaled by the bar was above the reference arrows outlined on the 
screen (see Figure 10, panel a), the liquid reward would have been delivered. In this 
way, participants were motivated in keeping the pressure level as high as possible by 
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continuously squeezing the rubber bulb. Due to the anatomy of the bulb, after one 
squeeze the pressure increased and dropped very fast, irrespective of whether the bulb 
was released or remained squeezed. Therefore, in order to keep the level above the limit 
required, participants needed to squeeze the bulb vigorously and repeatedly. This 
instrumental action, which was performed with the non-dominant hand, required a 
significant effort. The three time windows were randomly selected on each trial across 
the whole 10 s period of stimulation with the restriction of being separated by at least 
1500 ms. If the conditions were satisfied, the liquid was dropped into a visible glass by 
the apparatus and the stimulation appeared on the screen. So the reward gain for each 
trial could range from a maximum of three deliveries to a minimum of none. Therefore, 
despite depending on participants’ effort, the instrumental reward schedule was 
probabilistic. Indeed, probabilistic schedule in this phase strengthens PIT (Cartoni, 
Moretta, Puglisi-allegra, Cabib, & Baldassarre, 2015). Due to the ongoing and increasing 
fatigue, each of the 20 trials was separated by a resting period that randomly ranged 
from 6 to 10 s, during which participants were invited to relax their forearm. 
Second phase: Pavlovian conditioning 
In this phase, participants were instructed to passively pay attention to the CSs 
on the screen, and that the reward was going to be delivered for free. Each trial started 
with a central fixation cross presented for 1000 ms. Then, one of the three CSs appeared 
accompanied by its associated sound for 3500 ms. A relatively long CS exposure was 
adopted to maximize the effect of Pavlovian conditioning (Holmes et al., 2010). Each CS 
had a fixed associated probability of signaling the reward delivery. The CS-US 
probabilities were .2, .5 or .8 and were unknown to participants. CSs associated color, 
sound and probability were randomized across participants. A probabilistic schedule 
was chosen to add some uncertainty to the task, in order to sustain participant’s 
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attention and to delay extinction during the last PIT phase (Haselgrove, Aydin, & Pearce, 
2004). In cases of reward delivery, the apparatus dropped the liquid in a visible glass 
and a simulation of a filling glass appeared on the screen for 1000 ms. Conversely, an 
empty glass appeared on the screen for 1000 ms and no liquid was delivered (see Figure 
10, panel b). A delay conditioning was used such that the presence of the CS overlapped 
with the delivery of the US. After an inter trial interval of 1500 ms, the next trial began. 
Across all 45 trials, the three CSs appeared an equal number of times and the order of 
presentation was randomized. 
At the end of this phase, participants were asked to assess the CS-US 
contingencies on a 10-point scale, with 0 meaning that the reward “never” followed the 
CS, and 9 that it “always” did. 
PIT 
Participants performed the PIT task 10 minutes after the Pavlovian conditioning. 
Participants’ task and instructions were the same as in the first phase, but they were 
also told that they would have been presented with other stimuli on the screen. 
Importantly, participants were aware that the only way of getting the reward was by 
squeezing the rubber bulb. The three CSs appeared an equal number of times across the 
total 45 trials of this task. This task was performed in extinction, so unbeknownst to 
participants no secret time windows existed during the stimulation period, and 
therefore no reward was delivered during this phase (see Figure 10, panel c). However, 
participants expected the delivery of reward in this phase too. Despite a partial 
extinction has been used in humans PIT tests, with potential reward delivery (Colagiuri 
& Lovibond, 2015; Pool et al., 2015; Talmi et al., 2008), the main reason for not adopting 
this strategy was to measure the PIT without any confound given by additional reward-
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association learning events that would be inevitable with a partial extinction procedure 
(but see Bouton, 2011). 
After completion of the task, the amount of liquid that participant earned was 
converted in their preferred beverage and they were allowed to drink it. 
 
 
Figure 10. Schematic representation of the experimental procedure of Experiment 
4. 
(a) Phase one: instrumental conditioning; (b) Phase two: Pavlovian conditioning; 
(c) Phase three: PIT test (see Methods for details). (d) A graphical example of a 
trial output in the PIT test phase (and in the instrumental conditioning) showing 
the absolute pressure (expressed in Volts, vertical axis) sampled at 10 Hz during 
the stimulation period (100 samples for 10 s, horizontal axis). 
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RESULTS 
All participants reported to be thirsty at the beginning of the experiment. Eight 
participants (26.7% of the sample) chose a sugary drink as US, while the rest (73.3%) 
chose plain water. The mean ratings of the CS-reward contingencies reported by 
participants on a 10-point scale were the followings: for p = .2, M = 3.67, SD = 1.75; for p 
= .5, M = 5.23, SD = 1.65; for p = .8, M = 6.70, SD = 1.64. The following analysis includes all 
participants. 
Figure 10, panel d depicts an example of a trial outcome in the PIT test phase 
(and during instrumental conditioning). For each participant and for each trial, I 
extracted three variables of squeezing effort: mean pressure, peak pressure and number 
of grips. To detect a possible extinction-like trend across trials (i.e. the effort declined as 
the test unfolded), for each CS I divided the data into five temporally consecutive bins. 
Mean pressure 
First, I calculated the mean pressure by averaging all the samples within each 
trial. In case of a PIT effect, the mean pressure should increase as a function of the CS-US 
associated probability. Data were entered into a repeated measures ANOVA with 
Contingency (.2, .5 and .8) and Time (1 to 5 bins) as within-subjects factors, and Drink 
(water and sugary) as a between-subjects factor (when needed the degree of freedom 
were Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). The ANOVA showed a significant main effect of 
Contingency, F(1.37, 38.23) = 6.36, p = .009, ηp
2  = .185, a significant main effect of Time, 
F(2.45, 68.58) = 3.96, p = .017, ηp
2  = .124, but not a significant effect of Drink (p = .743) or 
any significant interaction (Contingency X Drink, p = .188; Time X Drink, p = .187; 
Contingency X Time, p = .797; Contingency X Time X Drink, p = .749; see Figure 11, panel 
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a and d). Data significantly fitted a linear trend for both the Contingency factor, F(1, 28) 
= 10.38, p = .003, ηp
2  = .270, and the Time factor, F(1, 28) = 9.04, p = .006, ηp
2  = .244.  
Peak pressure 
I calculated the peak pressure (i.e. the most powerful squeeze) by extracting the 
highest value of the samples in each trial. Again, the peak pressure should increase with 
CS-US associated probability. As expected, a repeated measures ANOVA with the same 
factors as before showed a significant main effect of Contingency, F(1.59, 44.58) = 5.17, p 
= .015, ηp
2  = .156, a significant main effect of Time, F(2.21, 61.77) = 4.92, p = .008, ηp
2  = 
.149, but not a significant effect of Drink (p = .646) or any significant interaction 
(Contingency X Drink, p = .352; Time X Drink, p = .265; Contingency X Time, p = .672; 
Contingency X Time X Drink, p = .878; see Figure 11 ,panel b and e). Data significantly 
fitted a linear trend for both the Contingency factor, F(1, 28) = 7.20, p = .012, ηp
2  = .205, 
and the Time factor, F(1, 28) = 8.47, p = .007, ηp
2  = .232.  
Number of grips 
The number of grips (squeezes) was obtained by extracting the number of peaks 
on the samples (for example, the number of peaks in Figure 10, panel d is 19), which 
should increase as a function of the CS-US associated probability. Accordingly, a 
repeated measures ANOVA with the same factors as before showed a significant main 
effect of Contingency, F(1.59, 44.63) = 3.82, p = .038, ηp
2  = .120, but neither a significant 
main effect of Time (p = .080), nor a significant effect of Drink (p = .308), nor any other 
significant interaction (Contingency X Drink, p = .730; Time X Drink, p = .437; 
Contingency X Time, p = .855; Contingency X Time X Drink, p = .965; see Figure 11, panel 
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c and f). For the Contingency factor, data significantly fitted a linear trend, F(1, 28) = 
7.83, p = .009, ηp
2  = .218. 
 
 
Figure 11. Graphical representation of the results of Experiment 4. 
(a) Mean pressure of PIT test as a function of CS-associated probability. (b) Peak 
pressure of PIT test as a function of CS-associated probability. (c) Number of grips 
of PIT test as a function of CS-associated probability. (d) Mean pressure in PIT test 
as a function of CS-associated probability and time. (e) Peak pressure in PIT test as 
a function of CS-associated probability and time. (f) Number of grips in PIT test as a 
function of CS-associated probability and time. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals for within-subjects designs (Cousineau, 2005). 
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DISCUSSION 
Experiment 4 was successful in producing the PIT effect. The amount of effort 
(bulb squeezing) that participants made to obtain the liquid reward varied as a function 
of the CS contingency, as attested by the increments in all the three effort variables 
considered (mean and peak pressure, and the number of grips). That is, the high-
probability (p = .8) CS triggered an increased effort as compared to the lower-
probability CSs, which is an index of the PIT effect. These results are in line with 
previous literature on PIT in humans (Bray, Rangel, Shimojo, Balleine, & O’Doherty, 
2008; Pool et al., 2015; Talmi et al., 2008) and add to existing evidence showing that 
Pavlovian CSs can acquire the motivational power to spur and invigorate an 
instrumental action for the associated outcome. 
The CS-US contingency ratings indicate that, on average, participants learned the 
predictive value of the CSs during the Pavlovian conditioning, which then affected the 
subsequent PIT test. Given that the CSs were never trained in association with the 
instrumental squeezing of the rubber bulb, it is conceivable that the PIT effect emerged 
because CSs retrieved the US representation, which in turn enhanced the associated 
instrumental action. 
Despite the addictive-like properties of sugar (Avena & Hoebel, 2003; Schulte et 
al., 2015; Stouffer et al., 2015) the drink factor had no apparent influence on the 
subsequent PIT effect. Indeed, participants chose both sugary drinks and plain water as 
rewards, but the instrumental invigorating effect given by the CS was not modulated by 
their choice. 
Despite the overall general effort declined as time unfolded, thus following an 
extinction trend in the test phase, the non-significant interaction between Contingency 
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and Time suggests that the CS exerted its influence on the instrumental action 
throughout the whole test phase. 
The general picture that emerged from Experiment 4 was that the setting was 
well suited for measuring a reliable PIT effect. Therefore, in the next chapters I could 
rely on this paradigm to implement a further manipulation. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE K MANIPULATION ON 
THE ATTENTIONAL BIAS 
THE ROLE OF PHYSIOLOGICAL STATES  
It may sound trivial to argue that the state of need of an organism would affect 
the perceived properties of a related stimulus, at least in motivational terms. As a typical 
example, food would be attractive if an organism is hungry, but not attractive if it is not 
(Piech, Pastorino, & Zald, 2010; Tapper, Pothos, & Lawrence, 2010). We all know that a 
piece of our favorite cake seems irresistible and delicious when we are hungry, but 
might become sickly sweet and unattractive when we are fully sated. Indeed, it has been 
shown that substance related stimuli (e.g. smoking, alcohol, cocaine and heroin words or 
images) are attractive for regular substance users and addicts but not for non-users or 
light users (Field & Cox, 2008). The dynamic fluctuation of the motivational state 
relevant to a reward, such as states of appetite, drug-induced or stress states, might 
engage the cognitive system differently. An interesting issue, however, is if this 
mechanism operates also for reward associated cues, namely, whether the motivational 
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properties of a reward-associated cue are affected by the physiological state relevant to 
the reward at the moment the cue is encountered. 
In the context of the incentive-sensitization theory, the incentive salience 
attributed the CS is not a fixed property determined by its contingency with the reward, 
but rather the CS incentive salience varies with the physiological state of the organism. 
In other words, in order for the system to estimate the appropriate cue-related incentive 
salience, the information given by the cue at the moment of its encounter needs to be 
integrated by the physiological appetite state at that precise moment. This idea stems 
from the observation by Toates (1986), who argued that the hedonic value of incentive 
stimuli, like primary rewards, is modulated by drive states, a phenomenon previously 
called alliesthesia by Cabanac (1979). 
This notion is at the core of the computational model of incentive salience 
proposed by Zhang and collaborators (Zhang, Berridge, Tindell, Smith, & Aldridge, 
2009). The model combines the learned cue-reward (i.e. CS-US) association with the 
current physiological state (K) relevant to the reward associated with the cue. According 
to the model, a change (increment or decrement) of K corresponds to a variation of the 
CS incentive salience in the same direction. Alternatively, no variation in “wanting” 
happens if K remains constant. So for example if K is high when the CS-US learning 
relation is learned, and K remains high when the CS is re-encountered, the CS-triggered 
incentive salience will remain high. In other words, if K decreases or increases, the CS-
triggered incentive salience changes accordingly.  
In agreement with this view, previous studies have addressed how K modulates 
the motivational component of the cue incentive salience, by showing that a cue-
triggered “wanting” can be disproportionally high if K is boosted by a sensitization of the 
mesolimbic system, by means of amphetamine injections in the Nucleolus Accumbens, 
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or by means of an altered stress state (Pool et al., 2015; Smith, Berridge, & Aldridge, 
2011; Wyvell & Berridge, 2001). 
There are cases, however, that challenge the notion that the physiological state 
affects the incentive salience of the reward cue. Animal studies show, for example, that a 
CS can still trigger the pursuit of reward even when the reward is devalued (Holland, 
2004; Wilson, Sherman, & Holman, 1981). Furthermore, the instrumental performance 
of rats can remain high when the outcome is not desirable anymore because of a shift 
from a hunger to a satiety state, a phenomenon known as resistance to satiation 
(Balleine, 1992). 
One possible explanation for the failure of a shift of CS value as a consequence of 
reward devaluation might be attributed to the learning procedure adopted (Berridge, 
2001). One may note, indeed, that the idea that the CS incentive salience varies with the 
physiological state is mainly questioned by studies that have used instrumental 
conditioning paradigms. Within this type of learning, the instrumental response is 
different from a Pavlovian related response. According to the original idea of  Thorndike 
(1911), the mechanism involved in the stimulus-response-reinforcement (S-R) relies on 
the reinforcing properties of the reward that strengthens the S-R association, so that 
given a stimulus, a response is emitted. This learning mechanism does not require the 
agent to form a representation of a causal relation between its response and the 
outcome, or in other words to know the causal consequences of its action (Balleine & 
Dickinson, 1998). If an agent does not know the consequences of its action, it cannot 
adjust its behavior according to the relevance of the outcome or its motivational states. 
The seminal investigations of Dickinson, Balleine and colleagues, however, suggested 
that an instrumental response can be a goal-directed action when the S-R is not over 
trained (i.e. the response is not habitual), and requires the cognitive representation of 
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both the outcome value and the action-outcome causal relation (Dickinson & Balleine, 
1994). It might be then argued that an instrumental action is sustained more by a 
cognitive incentive salience mechanism based on the reward value, rather than by an 
implicit and visceral incentive salience (“wanting”) triggered by the Pavlovian CS. In 
other words, the inability of reward devaluation to affect the instrumental action would 
not pertain to incentive salience or “wanting”, but rather to a cognitive form of incentive. 
However, both incentive mechanisms are important for motivation, as they have similar 
and concurring effects on behavior, and their differentiation can be subtle (Berridge, 
2001). For example, as described in Chapter 2, in a PIT paradigm the presence of an 
irrelevant CS previously paired with the reward can increase the instrumental 
responding for the same reward, a phenomenon that is usually interpreted as an 
incentive motivational state triggered by the CS (Berridge, 2012; Holland, 2004). The 
hypothesis concerning different learning mechanism appears to be, therefore, 
unsatisfying. 
When a cue-triggered persistent “wanting” for a devalued reward is observed, it 
is legitimate to hypothesize that the cue has maintained a high level of incentive salience 
despite the reduced physiological activation state of the organism. This condition has 
been interpreted “as excessive enduring cue-triggered “wanting”, which has detached 
from the US value” (Berridge, 2012 p1131). In other words, it is possible that once a CS 
has gained incentive properties from its association with an appetitive US, it could retain 
its incentive salience independently from changes in the US value. As acknowledged by 
Berridge, this possibility deserves further investigations, because “we need a better 
understanding of how detachments of CS motivation from US value can occur” (Berridge, 
2012 p1131). 
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In light of this complex scenario, in the following experiments I sought to address, 
in humans, whether the physiological state can modulate the motivational component 
(“wanting”) of the reward cue, as expressed by the corresponding attentional 
component (Experiment 5 & 6) and the performance related properties (Experiment 7), 
by means of a controlled reward devaluation procedure. 
THE CASE OF ATTENTIONAL BIAS 
Does the attentional grabbing power of a reward-predicting cue change as a 
function of the relevant physiological state? Recent studies seem to provide an initial 
affirmative answer to this question. For example, it has been reported that attention 
ceased to be captured by a chocolate odor cue once human participants had consumed 
chocolate at will (Pool et al., 2014). In other words, reward devaluation seems to 
diminish the corresponding CS attentional salience. Symmetrically, another animal study 
showed that a learned repulsion (i.e. a low incentive salience) for a CS that predicts an 
unpleasant salty taste (US) can immediately make the CS attractive if a new salt appetite 
is induced in rats (M. J. F. Robinson & Berridge, 2013; Tindell et al., 2009). 
However, in the previous section I have discussed cases suggesting the possibility 
of a failure of a shift of a cue motivational salience following US devaluation, as predicted 
by the Zhang model. In these cases, the cue incentive salience might detach from the US 
value. In the context of attention, the cue attentional grabbing power might not be 
affected by the modulation of the primary organism’s motivational states. 
The next experiment aimed at testing whether the attentional salience of a 
reward-predicting cue changes as a function of the state of thirst. In Experiment 5, 
thirsty participants first underwent a conditioning phase through which visual cue 
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gained differential incentive properties by being associated, with different 
contingencies, with the delivery of a liquid incentive. Importantly, the liquid was not 
consumed during this phase, but its accumulation was visible to participants and thus 
worked as a potent incentive. The procedure was identical to the one of Experiment 1 
(Chapter 2). As a reminder, in Experiment 1 participants performed the test phase 
consisting in a visual search task carried out in extinction while still thirsty. Results 
showed that the best reward-predicting cue preferentially engaged attention, and 
therefore gained the greatest motivational value. Experiment 5 used the same paradigm, 
but crucially participants were allowed to drink between the conditioning and the test 
phase. In this way, as predicted by the Zhang model, the incentive salience of the cues 
should be diminished, because the physiological state of the organism was reduced 
before the cue was re-encountered in the test phase. It follows that no attentional bias 
should emerge in the visual search task. By contrast, if once established the incentive 
salience of the cue can be decoupled from the current drive state, I could expect the 
attentional capture to outlast reward devaluation. In other words, Experiment 5 was 
meant to be a stringent test for the Zhang model (Zhang et al., 2009). 
Experiment 6 was administered as a control for the attribution of the attentional 
effect to the motivational properties of the US, and not to other possible mechanisms at 
work during the conditioning phase. In Experiment 6, the incentive property of the 
beverage was devalued from the outset, before participants underwent the conditioning 
phase. In this condition, none of the cues should gain incentive salience, because the 
liquid was devoid of any incentive properties. Under these circumstances, no attentional 
modulation was expected to emerge in the test phase.  
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EXPERIMENT 5 
METHODS 
Participants 
Twenty undergraduate students (Mage = 21.2 years, 15 females) took part in the 
experiment after providing informed consent. They were asked not to drink for about 4 
hours prior to the experimental session. They received €5 compensation for their 
participation. The experiment was carried out in accordance with the Declaration of 
Helsinki, and with the approval of the local research Ethics Committee (Comitato per la 
sperimentazione sull’essere umano dell’Università di Trento). 
Apparatus 
The same as in Experiment 1 (see Chapter 2). 
Stimuli 
The same as in Experiment 1. 
Procedure 
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1, except that participants were 
allowed to drink ad libitum after the conditioning phase and before the visual search 
task (see Figure 12). Importantly, they drank the beverage they had chosen as reward 
during the conditioning phase, so that I specifically devalued the reward associated with 
the cue. Although they were not forced to, they were encouraged to drink to quench 
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their thirst. To evaluate their level of thirst, participants completed a 3-item 
questionnaire on a 5-point Likert scale twice, the first time as soon as they arrived to the 
lab and before beginning the conditioning phase, and the second time soon after they 
drunk and before beginning the visual search task. The three items, taken from a 
previous study on water deprivation in humans (Rolls et al., 1980), were presented on 
the screen in this order: 
1. How thirsty do you feel now? (not at all – very thirsty) 
2. How pleasant would it be to drink something now? (very unpleasant – very 
pleasant) 
3. How dry does your mouth feel now? (very dry – not at all) 
Participants began the visual search task approximately 10 minutes later, an 
interval long enough to permit the assimilation of the fluid by the body, as reflected by 
both physiological and psychological measures (Rolls et al., 1980). 
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Figure 12. Phase diagram for Experiment 5 and 6 and physiological state relative to 
the beverage reward that corresponded to each phase. 
See procedure for details. 
 
RESULTS 
All participants reported to be thirsty at the beginning of the experiment. Only 
two participants ranked the cue-reward contingency in the wrong order, and thus would 
be categorized as “unaware”. However, since the small group size, participants were not 
separated. Therefore, the following analysis includes all participants. First I analyzed the 
RTs for correct responses (88.2%) in the visual search task (outliers <2%). A one-way 
for repeated measures ANOVA showed with Contingency (.2, .5 and .8) as a within 
subjects factor showed a significant main effect of Contingency, F(2, 38) = 7.19, p = .002, 
ηp
2  = .274. Data significantly fitted a linear trend, F(1, 19) = 15.21, p = .001, ηp
2  = .445 (see 
Figure 13 panel a). Pairwise comparisons (one-tailed t test) showed that RTs in the p = 
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.8 condition were significantly shorter than RTs in the p = .5 and p = .2 conditions, t(19) 
= 1.74, p = .048, d = 0.389, and t(19) = 3.90, p < .001, d = 0.872, respectively. 
I then analyzed the accuracy across cues in the visual search task. A one-way for 
repeated measures ANOVA on accuracy showed no significant effect of Contingency (p = 
.088). 
Next, I analyzed how participants rated their level of thirst before the beginning 
of the conditioning phase and after they drank but before the beginning of the visual 
search task. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test indicated that post-task ranks were 
significantly lower than the pre-task ranks for all the three items (Z = 210, p < .001; Z = 
190, p < .001; Z = 210, p < .001 respectively), a pattern of results showing that the 
devaluation procedure was successful. 
A one-way for repeated measures ANOVA on the rate of instrumental responses 
associated with the different cue colors (i.e. reward probability) in the conditioning 
phase showed a significant main effect of Contingency, F(2, 38) = 50.99, p < .001, ηp
2  = 
.729. Data significantly fitted a linear trend, F(1, 19) = 115.23, p < .001, ηp
2  = .858. 
I also analyzed the RTs for correct responses (97.4%) in the conditioning phase 
(outliers <2%). A one-way for repeated measures ANOVA again showed a significant 
main effect of Contingency, F(2, 58) = 28.40, p < .001, ηp
2  = .599. Data significantly fitted a 
linear trend, F(1, 19) = 69.45, p < .001, ηp
2  = .785 (see Figure 13 panel b). As in 
Experiment 1, the increment in response rate and the decrement in RTs as a function of 
reward probability was taken as reliable evidence that conditioning took place (Pool et 
al., 2014; Talmi et al., 2008). 
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Finally, the mean ratings of the cue-reward contingencies reported by 
participants on a 10-point scale were the followings: for p = .2, M = 2.05, SD = 1.05; for p 
= .5, M = 4.55, SD = 1.39; for p = .8, M = 7.25, SD = 0.97. 
 
 
Figure 13. Graphical representation of the results of Experiment 5 and 6. 
(a) Visual search RTs in Experiment 5 plotted as a function of cue-reward 
contingencies. (b) Visual search RTs in Experiment 6 plotted as a function of cue-
reward contingencies. (c) Conditioning RTs in Experiment 5 plotted as a function of 
cue-reward contingencies. (d) Conditioning RTs in Experiment 6 plotted as a 
function of cue-reward contingencies. Error bars represent 95% confidence 
intervals for within-subjects designs (Cousineau, 2005). 
 
DISCUSSION 
The aim of Experiment 5 was to test the persistence of the cue attentional 
salience after the reward was devalued. Contrary to the expectation suggested by the 
Zhang model, the results showed that the best reward predictor (cue) retained its 
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attentional salience despite the reward devaluation. This challenges the idea that the cue 
updates automatically its attentional salience when there is a shift in the participants’ 
physiological state. By contrast, the cue retained some incentive properties (at least the 
attentional component) independently of the new motivational state of the organism. 
This result, while apparently at odds with the Zhang model, could be accounted for by 
the attentional value learning hypothesis, according to which the updated irrelevancy of 
the cue must be re-learned with an additional associative phase (Pearce & Bouton, 
2001). This possibility is further examined in a following chapter. 
Data from the conditioning phase were similar to those of Experiment 1: 
participants’ motivation for the three cues was different, as revealed by the different 
response rates. In addition, the conditioning was successful as revealed by the difference 
in RTs during the conditioning phase. 
As a final control, in the next experiment the reward was devalued before 
participants were submitted to the conditioning procedure. Under these conditions, no 
attentional bias was expected to emerge in the visual search task. 
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EXPERIMENT 6 
METHODS 
Participants 
Twenty undergraduate students (Mage = 20.4 years, 15 females) took part in the 
experiment after providing informed consent. They were asked not to drink for about 4 
hours prior to the experimental session. They received €5 compensation for their 
participation. The experiment was carried out in accordance with the Declaration of 
Helsinki, and with the approval of the local research Ethics Committee (Comitato per la 
sperimentazione sull’essere umano dell’Università di Trento). 
Apparatus 
As in the previous experiment. 
Stimuli 
As in the previous experiment. 
Procedure 
As in Experiment 1, but at the beginning of the experiment participants were 
allowed to drink ad libitum before the conditioning phase (see Figure 12). In this way, it 
seems reasonable to assume that the beverage seen during conditioning lost its 
incentive properties. Like in Experiment 5, participants completed the same three-item 
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questionnaire twice, once before the beginning of the conditioning phase and once 
before the beginning of the visual search task. 
 
RESULTS 
All participants reported to be thirsty at the beginning of the experiment. I 
analyzed participants’ ranking of the cue-reward contingency: participants were divided 
in “aware” (n = 8) and “unaware” (n = 12). It is worth reminding that participants began 
the conditioning phase after their thirst was quenched, so they were not motivated in 
maximizing the unrewarding outcome and this might explain the high proportion of 
unaware participants. However, it is not possible to exclude that aware participants, 
even if unmotivated, showed an attentional bias. Therefore, I first analyzed the RTs for 
correct responses (90%) in the visual search task (outliers <2%) by means of a repeated 
measures ANOVA including all (n = 20) participants with Contingency (.2, .5, and .8) as a 
within-subject factor and Group (aware and unaware) as a between subject factor. No 
significant effect of Contingency x Group interaction emerged (p = .920), as well as no 
main effect of Contingency (p = .276) or Group (p = .484), thus indicating that participant 
did not differentiate their RTs across the different cues (see Figure 13 panel c) and this 
behavior was not modulated by their cue-reward awareness as in Experiment 1. 
Therefore, the following analysis was administered on all participants. 
I then analyzed the accuracy across cues in the visual search task. A one-way for 
repeated measures ANOVA on accuracy showed no significant effect of Contingency (p = 
.174). 
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I then analyzed how participants rated their level of thirst by comparing their 
responses in the first and the second test administration. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
indicated Items 2 and 3 did not change between the first and the second test (p = .312 
and p = .152 respectively), whereas Item 1 was significantly higher in the second test (Z 
= 9.0, p = .017). 
A one-way for repeated measures ANOVA on the response rate during the 
conditioning phase showed a significant main effect of Contingency, F(1.24, 23.64) = 
4.36, p = .040, ηp
2  = .187. Data significantly fitted a linear trend, F(1, 19) = 5.64, p = .028, 
ηp
2  = .229. 
Although the response rates varied as a function of the different cues, the 
difference in conditioning RTs (outliers <2%) was not significant (p = .198; see Figure 13 
panel d), which suggests that actually in Experiment 6 no conditioning took place (Pool 
et al., 2014; Talmi et al., 2008). 
Finally, the mean ratings of the cue-reward contingencies reported by 
participants on a 10-point scale were the followings: for p = .2, M = 3.15, SD = 2.03; for p 
= .5, M = 4.70, SD = 1.98; for p = .8, M = 5.35, SD = 2.60. 
DISCUSSION 
Experiment 6 served to control that the attentional bias emerged in Experiment 5 
(and also in the experiments presented in Chapter 2) was due to the motivational 
properties of the liquid incentive during conditioning. To this aim, reward was devalued 
before participants began the experiment, as confirmed by the low rates of thirst given 
in the questionnaire before the conditioning phase. Under these conditions, and as 
predicted by the incentive-sensitization theory, there was no incentive salience expected 
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to transfer from the beverage to the best predictive cue, and no bias of attention should 
have emerged in the visual search task. In agreement with this prediction, the visual 
search task revealed no RTs difference. 
Although to a smaller extent, the response rate in the conditioning phase differed 
across the cues, as it occurred in Experiment 1 and 5. Because participants drank ad 
libitum before the conditioning phase, it is reasonable to assume that they were not 
particularly motivated to maximize the beverage gain, and therefore the different 
response rates were unexpected. A reasonable explanation is that once engaged in the 
task participants tried to play at their best in any case, irrespective of whether they were 
really “physiologically” interested in the liquid reward. However, the small difference in 
response rates alone cannot be taken as a reliable index of conditioning, because no RTs 
differences emerged across the different cue, as instead found in previous experiments 
(Pool et al., 2014; Talmi et al., 2008). 
GENERAL DISCUSSION  
The key result of Experiment 5 and 6 is that the attentional salience of a reward 
cue outlasted the devaluation of its associated reward, with reward here meaning 
unconditioned incentive (Bindra, 1978; Toates, 1986; Wise, 2004). As showed in 
Chapter 2, the best reward predictor during an initial conditioning phase performed 
while participants were thirsty, later triggered an attentional bias during a visual search 
task. Surprisingly, the attentional grabbing power of the strongest cue persisted with a 
comparable magnitude even when the incentive salience of the associated reward was 
devalued before the visual search task (Experiment 5). This evidence is consistent with 
the existing literature on value-based attentional learning (Chelazzi et al., 2013) and can 
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be further explained by assuming that attention is preferentially deployed towards good 
reward predictors (Mackintosh, 1975). However, the fact that the incentive cue no 
longer captured attention when the salience of the incentive stimulus was devalued 
before the conditioning phase (Experiment 6) may suggest a possible role of 
motivational salience. Hence, the persistent attentional bias that emerged in Experiment 
5 could be attributed to the incentive salience acquired by the cue during conditioning. 
The fact that in Experiment 5 the most predictive cue captured attention despite 
reward devaluation is a result at odds with the Zhang model (also see Balleine, 1992; 
Dickinson & Balleine, 1994; Holland, 2004; Wilson et al., 1981). The model predicts that 
the incentive salience of the cue should be updated automatically after a shift in the 
primary drive state of the agent. In other words, if attentional bias is a hallmark of 
incentive salience, according to the Zhang model no attentional bias should have 
emerged in Experiment 5. However, the results were not in agreement with this 
prediction. Rather they suggest the possibility that, once established through 
conditioning, the incentive salience of the cue became independent from the 
motivational value of the US, which was weakened by changing the drive state (here 
thirst) of the organism. 
The present findings are also not completely in line with the study by Pool et al. 
(2014). Both this study and Pool’s study showed that incentive cues acquire attentional 
priority through their association with a primary reward, but contrary to the present 
findings Pool et al. (2014) found that the cue salience decreased after reward 
devaluation. The authors adopted a paradigm based on a spatial cueing task, in which 
two previously cues served as attentional cues. During the conditioning phase, one cue 
(CS+) was always paired with a chocolate odor, whereas the other cue (CS-) was always 
paired with odorless air. Then, in the spatial cueing task, target discrimination was 
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faster at the position cued by the CS+ as compared to that cued by the CS-, thus showing 
that the CS+ summoned attention. However, this effect disappeared after participants 
ate chocolate until satiety. It is not obvious how to reconcile this result with that of 
Experiment 5, but one may note that in the paradigm adopted here participants 
performed a visual search task using a relatively crowded display, a paradigm perhaps a 
bit more challenging and sensitive than a simple spatial cueing task to detect evidence of 
attentional capture triggered by the cue incentive salience. 
The persistence of the cue salience after reward devaluation is also puzzling in 
light of the results by M. J. F. Robinson and Berridge (2013) and Tindell et al. (2009). 
These studies showed that a repulsive cue paired with a salt state aversion became 
immediately attractive when a state of sodium depletion was chemically induced, thus 
making the salt an appetitive US. The transformation from repulsion to attraction took 
place without the animal being exposed anew to the cue-reward contingency, but rather 
it occurred just by virtue of the abrupt change in the motivational state of the organism 
with respect to the US, which suddenly became highly wanted. This result is rather 
interesting and raises a crucial question: if the initial motivational value of the cue is 
acquired during a consistent pairing with the US, how is it possible that its value can 
shift from aversive to appetitive without a new conditioning phase? The only possibility 
is that the change in the US motivational value is instantly passed to the cue via the 
association formerly established on the basis of the contingency between the two stimuli 
(i.e. a pure predictive learning process). However, if this were the case, here it should be 
expected the cue attentional salience to change immediately once the reward was 
devalued (Experiment 5). But this is not what it was found, which seems to suggest that 
while the cue motivational salience (i.e. “wanting”) can be immediately updated as a 
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function of the US value, once established the cue attentional salience can be at least 
partially independent from the US value, thus outlasting the US devaluation. 
Finally, a remaining issue that deserves to be discussed is the nature of the 
attentional bias I have reported. In my view, the strongest cue acquired its attentional 
bias by virtue of its association with the reward, a process that may have also conferred 
the cue an increased incentive salience via Pavlovian conditioning (Berridge, Robinson, 
& Aldridge, 2009). However, because each cue was differently paired in terms of 
probability with the reward, the cue response probability varied accordingly during 
conditioning. Thus, participants were more likely to respond to the best predictive cue 
as compared to the other two cues. Yet, the fact that each cue elicited a response with a 
different probability raises the question of whether the attentional bias was in fact due 
to a different cue selection history (Awh et al., 2012). In addition to the evidence that 
emerged in Experiments 2 and 3 (reported in Chapter1), there are additional reasons 
why this is not the case. As already discussed, although each cue was associated with a 
different response probability, all cues were similarly attended in order to decide 
whether to respond or not. Still, one might argue that it is the rate of responding elicited 
by the cue that matters in terms of selection history (Chapman et al., 2014). However, if 
this were the case, I should have found an attentional bias also in Experiment 6, in which 
the response rates associated to each cue were statistically different. Since no 
attentional capture emerged in Experiment 6, as predicted by the incentive salience 
hypothesis, I can safely and more robustly dismiss the selection history account. 
In conclusion, the studies presented in this chapter give support to the hypothesis 
according to which a cue can acquire attentional properties through its Pavlovian 
association with an unconditioned incentive (Bucker & Theeuwes, 2017). Crucially, the 
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attractiveness of a reward cue can irrationally persist beyond the devaluation of the 
associated reward. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE K MANIPULATION ON 
THE PIT EFFECT 
In the preceding chapter I examined whether the learned incentive properties of 
a reward cue change when the motivational value of the associated US is altered. 
Specifically, the concept of incentive salience was operationalized as one of its more 
prominent characteristics: an attentional bias. In this chapter, the aim is to further 
examine the K manipulation by looking at another component of incentive salience. That 
is, the performance enhancement properties of a reward-cue. The leading question of 
this chapter is whether a change in the value of a US may affect the associated CS-
triggered effort as manifested by an instrumental action, measured in a PIT paradigm. In 
the context of the PIT studies, this remains an open question (Cartoni et al., 2016). 
Among the possible solutions to the problem, a theoretical suggestion comes 
from the already mentioned incentive salience model outlined by Zhang and colleagues 
(Zhang et al., 2009). Given that the CS incentive properties vary with K, the model 
predicts that an upward shift of K would correspond to an increased CS-triggered 
“wanting”, while a downward shift of K would cause a decrease of the CS incentive 
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salience. This prediction, however, is only partly confirmed by previous PIT studies 
modulating the US value, so that mixed evidence is present in the literature. 
In agreement with the model, human participants engaged in a “stock market 
game” did not increase their effort to obtain a depreciated currency when shown a 
previously learned CS for the same currency, thus reporting a successful outcome 
devaluation effect (Allman, DeLeon, Cataldo, Holland, & Johnson, 2010; Eder & Dignath, 
2016a). Likewise, when participants were exposed to a stressful experience, the PIT 
effect caused by a CS for a chocolate odor was amplified (Pool et al., 2015). However, 
successful devaluation procedures might have been effective on the PIT because of the 
specific paradigm used. Namely, a currency devaluation procedure in a “stock market 
game” could be interpreted as a cognitive rule as compared to a devaluation emerging 
from a motivational satiation procedure based on primary rewards (Cartoni et al., 
2016). Another element to take into consideration when addressing the differential 
effects of the US devaluation on PIT is provided by the Eder and Dignath study (Eder & 
Dignath, 2016b). When the devaluation of a primary reward was achieved by a taste 
aversion procedure, its consequence on PIT was effective only if participants had to 
consume the US immediately after earning it. 
A different scenario emerges from a number of studies on both humans and 
animals reporting that a CS retains its motivational control over instrumental responses 
(i.e. the PIT effect is unaffected) even if the corresponding US is devalued (Colagiuri & 
Lovibond, 2015; Colwill & Rescorla, 1990; Corbit et al., 2007; Hogarth & Chase, 2011; 
Holland, 2004; Watson, Wiers, Hommel, & De Wit, 2014). In particular, the enduring PIT 
effect despite reward devaluation has been interpreted as a persistent CS-triggered 
motivational response (Berridge, 2012). The fact that in some cases a persistent PIT 
effect was found despite reward devaluation may be partially explained by noticing that 
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some studies have used rewards whose incentive value cannot be easily diminished by 
means of satiation or single-taste aversion procedures. So, for example, a highly 
palatable food (e.g. chocolate or candies) as well as drugs (e.g. tobacco) could retain, at 
some level, the ability to activate motivational states irrespective of the organism’s 
satiation level. To put it differently, although a piece of cake is extremely motivationally 
salient when we are hungry, we all know that the same cake can still be desirable even 
after a full meal. In support of this possibility, a recent study reported that rats fail to 
exhibit devaluation effects in contexts paired with junk food as compared to contexts 
paired with less palatable regular chow (Kendig, Cheung, Raymond, & Corbit, 2016). In 
addition, although satiation was shown to be outcome-specific in some studies, it was 
not always drive-specific. So, for example, a previous study (Watson et al., 2014) showed 
that cues anticipating chocolate and popcorn increased the subsequent instrumental 
responding for the specific previously paired food (i.e. PIT), but satiation of one of the 
two foods failed to reduce the PIT effect. The apparent failure of reward devaluation can 
be explained by assuming that the food cue was effective because the food-specific 
satiation did not reduce the general hunger drive. 
In light of this intricate scenario, the aim of the next experiment is to clarify the 
effects of changes in the US value on the corresponding CS incentive salience. With this 
goal in mind, human participants were tested in a PIT paradigm defined by two key 
features: first, by using a primary reward, and second the reward could be easily 
devalued, thus changing the corresponding incentive motivation. I have already 
presented Experiment 4 (Chapter 3), in which thirsty participants were tested for PIT: 
they performed the instrumental action learned in the instrumental conditioning in the 
presence of one of the three possible CSs. Results showed that the strength of the PIT 
effect was proportional to the CS-US contingency, so the performance triggered by the 
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CS was greater as the CS-US probability increased. It is worth reminding that 
participants were free to choose their preferred US (plain water or well-known sugary 
beverages). In this section, the US choice is particularly important considering the 
assumption that plain water is not necessarily an intrinsic desirable stimulus (like e.g. 
chocolate or pleasant drugs), namely that its desirability is simply proportional to the 
organism’s level of thirst. By contrast, sugary beverages could be more resistant to 
devaluation by thirst quench because of the addictive-like properties of sugar (Avena & 
Hoebel, 2003; Schulte et al., 2015; Stouffer et al., 2015). In the next experiment, the 
procedure was identical to Experiment 4, except that participants’ thirst was quenched 
(i.e., the US was devalued and K was lowered) after Pavlovian conditioning and before 
undergoing the PIT test. This critical manipulation allowed to measure whether the PIT 
effect survived reward devaluation. Mean pressure, peak pressure and the number of 
grips acquired by means of the rubber bulb were taken as dependent measures of 
instrumental action. 
EXPERIMENT 7 
METHODS 
Participants 
Thirty-one undergraduate students (Mage = 22.2 years, 21 females) took part in 
the experiment after providing informed consent. One participant was excluded from 
the analysis because, for religious reasons, he refused to quench his thirst. They were 
asked not to drink for about 4 hours prior to the experimental session. The experiment 
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was carried out in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki, and with the approval of 
the local research Ethics Committee (Comitato per la sperimentazione sull’essere umano 
dell’Università di Trento). 
Apparatus 
The same as in Experiment 4. 
Stimuli 
The same as in Experiment 4. 
Procedure 
As in Experiment 4, but after the Pavlovian conditioning and before the PIT test 
participants were allowed to drink the beverage of their choice ad libitum (see Figure 
14). Although they were not forced to, they were encouraged to drink to quench their 
thirst. In this way, I implemented a sensory-specific devaluation of the US by immediate 
consumption and I manipulated the physiological factor K by lowering it. In order to 
assess whether the desired beverage seen during conditioning lost its incentive 
properties, participants completed a 3-item questionnaire as in Experiment 5. The scale 
was administered three times. The first time as soon as they arrived to the lab and 
before beginning the instrumental conditioning phase, the second time soon after they 
drunk but before beginning the PIT, and the third time at the end of the PIT test. 
Participants began the PIT test approximately 10 minutes later, an interval long 
enough to permit the uptake of the fluid into the body, as reflected by both physiological 
and psychological measures (Rolls et al., 1980). 
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Figure 14. Schematic representation of the procedure of Experiment 7. 
(a) Phase one: instrumental conditioning; (b) Phase two: Pavlovian conditioning; (c) 
Phase three: reward devaluation; (d) Phase four: PIT test (see Procedure for details). 
 
RESULTS 
Eight participants (26.7% of the sample) chose sugary a drink as US, while the 
rest (73.3%) chose plain water. The following analysis includes all participants. The 
mean ratings of the CS-reward contingencies reported by participants on a 10-point 
scale were the followings: for p = .2, M = 3.52, SD = 2.06; for p = .5, M = 4.94, SD = 1.36; 
for p = .8, M = 6.97, SD = 1.47. 
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Mean pressure 
As in Experiment 4, I first calculated the mean pressure. If PIT effect endured 
reward devaluation, the mean pressure should increase as a function of the CS-US 
associated probability. A repeated measures ANOVA with Contingency (.2, .5 and .8) and 
Time (1 to 5 bins) as within-subjects factors, and Drink (water and sugary) as a 
between-subjects factor showed a significant main effect of Contingency, F(2,56) = 5.28, 
p = .008, ηp
2  = .159, a significant main effect of Time, F(1.51, 42.37) = 5.45, p = .013, ηp
2  = 
.163, but not a significant effect of Drink (p = .227) or any significant interaction 
(Contingency X Drink, p = .626; Time X Drink, p = .611; Contingency X Time, p = .179; 
Contingency X Time X Drink, p = .569; see Figure 15, panel a and d). Data significantly 
fitted a linear trend for both the Contingency factor, F(1, 28) = 7.19, p = .012, ηp
2  = .204, 
and the Time factor, F(1, 28) = 6.57, p = .016, ηp
2  = .190. 
Peak pressure 
Secondly, I calculated the peak pressure. The peak pressure should increase as a 
function of the CS-US associated probability if the PIT effect is still present. A repeated 
measures ANOVA with the same factors as before, however, showed that the main effect 
of Contingency did not reach significance (p = .073), while the main effect of Time was 
significant, F(1.84, 51.46) = 9.72, p < .001, ηp
2  = .258, but there was not a significant effect 
of Drink (p = .335) or any significant interaction (Contingency X Drink, p = .716; Time X 
Drink, p = .719; Contingency X Time, p = .155; Contingency X Time X Drink, p = .067; see 
Figure 15, panel b and e). Data for the Time factor fitted significantly a linear trend, F(1, 
28) = 13.05, p = .001, ηp
2  = .318. 
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Number of grips 
Lastly, I evaluated the number of grips. An enduring PIT effect would show that 
the number of grips increases as a function of the CS-US associated probability. A 
repeated measures ANOVA with the same factors as before showed a significant main 
effect of Contingency, F(2, 56) = 5.23, p = .008, ηp
2  = .157, a significant main effect of 
Time, F(2.61, 73.10) = 4.32, p = .010, ηp
2  = .134, but not a significant effect of Drink (p = 
.833) or any significant interaction (Contingency X Drink, p = .623; Time X Drink, p = 
.793; Contingency X Time, p = .098; Contingency X Time X Drink, p = .167; see Figure 15, 
panel c and f). Data significantly fitted a linear trend for both the Contingency factor, F(1, 
28) = 7.83, p = .009, ηp
2  = .218, and the Time factor, F(1, 28) = 5.82, p = .023, ηp
2  = .172. 
The analyses have been Greenhouse-Geisser corrected when required. 
Thirst ratings 
I then analyzed how participants rated their level of thirst as soon as they arrived 
in the lab, after they drank but before beginning the PIT test, and at the end of the 
experiment. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test indicated that the ranks given after drinking (M 
= 1.47, SD = 0.82; M = 1.73, SD = 1.08; M = 1.40, SD = 0.89 respectively) were significantly 
lower than the initial ranks (M = 4.17, SD = 0.70; M = 4.47, SD = 0.57; M=3.93, SD=0.78 
respectively) for all the three items (Z = 463, p < .001; Z = 406, p < .001; Z = 462, p < .001 
respectively), a pattern of results showing that the devaluation procedure was 
successful. I also compared the ranks in the initial and the last survey. The same test 
indicated that for all the three items at the end of the experiment ranks were still 
significantly lower (M = 2.00, SD = 1.02; M = 2.27, SD = 1.14; M = 1.83, SD = 0.99 
respectively) than those observed at the beginning (Z = 404, p < .001; Z = 404, p < .001; Z 
= 460, p < .001 respectively). Lastly, I compared ranks in the last survey with those in 
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the second survey. The same analysis showed that, for all the three items, at the end of 
the experiment ranks were higher than those found after participants had drunk (Z = -
3.23, p = .005; Z = -2.11, p = .038; Z = -3.24, p = .006 respectively). 
Between-experiment comparison 
Because the PIT was still present in Experiment 7, as attested by the significant 
modulation of the different CS-predictive power on the instrumental performance, it 
was worth investigating if after reward devaluation such CS modulation is at least 
reduced. Since Experiments 4 and 7 were administered following the same procedure 
except for the US devaluation, the above question can be investigated by means of a 
between-experiment comparison analysis. 
Mean pressure 
A repeated measures ANOVA with Contingency (.2, .5 and .8) and Time (1 to 5 
bins) as within-subjects factors, and Group (Experiment 4 and 7) as a between-subjects 
factor showed no significant interaction between the three factors (p = .503), no 
significant interaction between Contingency X Group (p = .240) and no significant 
interaction between Time X Group (p = .679). The main effects of Contingency F(1.45, 
84.11) = 7.90, p = .002, ηp
2  = .120, Time F(2.27, 131.65) = 13.67, p < .001, ηp
2  = .191, and 
Group F(1, 58) = 8.15, p = .006, ηp
2  = .123, were all significant. The fact that the overall 
mean pressure in Experiment 7 was lower than Experiment 4 can simply be the result of 
a group difference. 
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Peak pressure 
The same ANOVA on the peak-pressure data showed no significant interaction 
between the three factors (p = .862), no significant interaction between Contingency X 
Group (p = .609) and no significant interaction between Time X Group (p = .878). The 
main effects of Contingency F(1.61, 93.87) = 8.03, p = .001, Time F(2.39, 138.90) = 20.27, 
p < .001, ηp
2  = .259, and Group F(1, 58) = 3.26, p = .037, ηp
2  = .073, were all significant. The 
fact that the overall peak pressure in Experiment 7 was lower than Experiment 4 can 
simply be the result of a group difference. 
Number of grips 
The same ANOVA on the number of grips showed no significant interaction 
between the three factors (p = .944), no significant interaction between Contingency X 
Group (p = .620) and no significant interaction between Time X Group (p = .801). The 
main effects of Contingency F(1.76, 101.82) = 9.13, p < .001, ηp
2  = .136, and Time F(2.61, 
151.49) = 9.19, p < .001, ηp
2  = .137 were significant. The main effect of Group did not 
reach significance (p = .069). 
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Figure 15. Graphical representation of the results of Experiment 7. 
(a) Mean pressure of PIT test as a function of CS-associated probability. (b) Peak 
pressure of PIT test as a function of CS-associated probability. (c) Number of grips 
of PIT test as a function of CS-associated probability. (d) Mean pressure in PIT test 
as a function of CS-associated probability and time. (e) Peak pressure in PIT test as 
a function of CS-associated probability and time. (f) Number of grips in PIT test as a 
function of CS-associated probability and time. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals for within-subjects designs (Cousineau, 2005). 
 
DISCUSSION 
Experiment 7 was designed to test the modulation of the PIT effect after reward 
devaluation. Two contrasting hypotheses were tested. According to the incentive 
salience model (Zhang et al., 2009), a decrease in the reward-driven physiological state 
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should translate into a decreased motivational power of the associated CS. Conversely, 
another possibility, suggested by previous animal studies, was that the incentive 
properties of the Pavlovian CSs should remain unchanged even after a devaluation of the 
associated reward. The result of Experiment 7 clearly supports the latter hypothesis, 
showing that the mean pressure and the number of grips increased significantly with the 
US predictive probability associated to the CS shown during the test phase (although the 
peak pressure modulation was not significant). 
That the US devaluation was effective is also suggested by the differences 
between pre- and post-ranks in the three-item thirst questionnaire reported by 
participants: all ranks were drastically reduced after participants drank to quench their 
thirst. Although at the end of the test phase ranks increased from those collected just 
after participants had drunk, they remained well below the initial ranks and far from 
signaling any thirst at all. However, this slight increase in ranks could signal that CSs 
might have stimulated the motivational properties of the associated US. Although I 
acknowledge that the three-item questionnaire might not appropriately reflect the 
constructs of wanting and liking in their explicit (or implicit) form (Pool, Sennwald, 
Delplanque, Brosch, & Sander, 2016), this idea deserves to be further investigated. 
Participants, on average, were aware of the CS-US contingencies as attested by 
their ratings. It is therefore plausible that the CS retrieved the representation of the US, 
which, however, was no longer highly desirable because of the devaluation procedure. 
Nevertheless, the US-associated instrumental action was still enhanced by the 
presentation of the CS. The non-significant main effect of Drink indicates that this effect 
emerged independently of the type of drink chosen as US, and endured throughout the 
whole test phase, as suggested by the lack of interaction between Contingency and Time. 
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The between-experiment comparison suggests that the magnitude of the PIT was 
not different between the Experiment 4 and Experiment 7. Although the overall 
performance was lower in Experiment 7, as indicated by the main effect of the Group 
factor, the differential invigorating effect of the CSs was comparable across the two 
experiments, as suggested by the lack of any interaction with the Group factor. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION  
Does a change in the incentive value of a primary reward (US) alter the 
motivational properties of the associated CS as expressed by performance? To address 
this question I took advantage of the PIT effect. 
The results of Experiment 4 provided a reliable setting to obtain a PIT measure. 
Indeed, the instrumental action performed to accumulate a beverage reward was 
enhanced by the presence of a consistent Pavlovian predictor of the beverage, thus 
corroborating the evidence of a human PIT effect. Moreover, while the general vigor of 
the instrumental action declined, the CS incentivizing power endured until the end of the 
task, a result consistent with the fact that the US maintained its incentive power since 
participants remained thirsty until the end of the experiment. 
Interestingly, however, the results of Experiment 7 showed that the influence of 
the Pavlovian CS on the instrumental performance outlasted reward devaluation. In 
addition, such influence was not different between the two experiments as indicated by 
the between-experiment comparison, suggesting that US devaluation did not attenuate 
the PIT effect. Because the instrumental response was not controlled by the actual value 
of the outcome, the persistence of the PIT effect is, to some extent, surprising. Previous 
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animal studies have already reported similar findings, but by using a standard palatable 
US (i.e. water), and by its direct and immediate consumption, here I showed that in 
humans the motivational power of a Pavlovian CS to modulate the instrumental 
performance can persist after reward devaluation. Although highly palatable sugary 
drinks are likely more desirable than plain water, the present results show that the 
endurance of PIT after US devaluation is unrelated to the palatability of the US used. 
The PIT resistance to US devaluation could be due to a progressive shift of the 
action control from a response-outcome representation to a stimulus-response 
association (i.e. the action becomes a habit; Cartoni et al., 2016). To exclude this 
possibility I adopted a relatively short instrumental training, in which the risk of shift 
from an action to a habit was minimized. One should note, however, that despite 
instrumental over-trained actions are indeed less sensitive to US devaluation, the same 
actions become more sensitive to PIT (Holland, 2004), and therefore the CS motivational 
persistence I documented cannot be interpreted as due to a habit formation, also 
because the CS and the action that it invigorated were never trained together. 
From a procedural perspective, it could be argued that the mercury-like bar 
appearing during both the instrumental conditioning phase and the PIT test phase, 
might have worked like a discriminative stimulus. To begin with, although I must 
acknowledge this is not a strong argument, an analogous procedure presenting a 
performance indicator both in the instrumental training and in the test phase has been 
used in previous studies (Pool et al., 2015; Talmi et al., 2008). Second, and most crucial, 
if the indicator had acted as a discriminative stimulus no differences in the rate of 
responding would have emerged as function of the Contingency, namely no PIT would 
have been observed. 
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According to the associative cybernetic model formulated by Balleine and 
Ostlund (Balleine & Ostlund, 2007) to explain the PIT effect, the CS activates the US 
representation, which in turn activates the action learned during instrumental 
conditioning. A straightforward prediction of the theory is that the PIT should be 
weakened when the representation of the US is no longer desirable, a condition that 
likely occurred in the test phase of Experiment 7. The unpredicted presence of the PIT 
effect in the same phase, therefore, suggests that the instrumental action was not 
motivated by the actual US sensory properties, but rather by the US sensory properties 
encoded previously during the conditioning phase. Another possibility, as suggested by 
the Konorskian view, is that the CS prediction and the US devaluation might affect 
different aspects of the US representation, and thus the CS can continue to exert its 
influence on the instrumental action by a motivational system activation (Dickinson & 
Balleine, 2002; Konorski, 1967). 
In compliance with the incentive-sensitization theory (T. E. Robinson & Berridge, 
2008), the results of Experiment 7 suggest a dissociation in the different measures of the 
reward components (Berridge & Robinson, 2003). Although participants explicitly 
reported neither to be thirsty nor to like receiving a drink, yet the presence of the CS 
increased the degree of instrumental effort participants were willing to make to obtain 
the devalued US. Specifically, the low ranks of the questionnaire items appear to be in 
contrast with the significant PIT effect, which has been interpreted as a measure of a 
more implicit “wanting” (Berridge & Robinson, 2003). Although the three-item 
questionnaire does not expressly adhere to the constructs of explicit wanting and liking 
as defined by the incentive-sensitization theory in its most recent formulation, it is 
worth noting that the questionnaire items could be considered at least an index of the 
participants’ explicit perception of the US. As advised in a recent review on the topic 
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(Pool et al., 2016), participants provided the ranks right after reward consumption, a 
procedure that seems appropriate to measure the participants hedonic experience. 
However, I cannot exclude the possibility that the questionnaire may instead reflect a 
more complex expected pleasantness about the US, a construct that refers to both 
cognitive desires and related past liking experiences.  
In this chapter I presented a study that adds to the existing evidence supporting 
the idea that a CS is not a mere predictor of the US, but rather is can become a powerful 
incentive, which can increase the effort the organism is willing to make in order to 
obtain the associated outcome. Here I showed that the motivational power of a CS can 
irrationally endure even after the associated outcome is no longer desirable, a result that 
is in line with previous findings on the reward cue attentional salience described in the 
previous chapter, and that can help explaining different addictive behaviors (M. J. F. 
Robinson, Robinson, & Berridge, 2014; T. E. Robinson & Berridge, 2008). 
  
 100 
CHAPTER 6 
THE INCENTIVE LEARNING HYPOTHESIS 
In the previous chapters, I have discussed how reward-associated cues become 
capable of influencing certain aspects of cognitive processes like attention and the 
control of instrumental action. Furthermore, I have shown some examples of how such 
capability can exert its influence beyond the actual value of the associated reward 
independently of the reward-related physiological state. At odds with the prediction 
according to which the cognitive system should prioritize cues of motivationally 
significant outcomes (Mackintosh, 1975), the data I have reported suggest that in some 
cases the motivational properties of a reward cue does not follow the dynamic change of 
the reward value. This suggestion is in line with the hypothesis that the CS value can 
detach from the US value (Berridge, 2012), a possibility that might explain the apparent 
irrational behaviors previously reported in Experiment 5 and 7 and add to other existing 
literature reviewed before. In this chapter, I will investigate how to update a cue value 
when the reward value changes. 
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A DUAL PROCESS THEORY OF INSTRUMENTAL MOTIVATION  
The mechanisms involved in the relation between learning processes and 
motivational systems have long been studied by Dickinson, Balleine and colleagues. The 
results of numerous investigations led the authors to formulate a dual process theory of 
instrumental motivation (Dickinson & Balleine, 1994), which aims at explaining the 
motivational control of an instrumental action. According to the theory, behavior is 
controlled by two separated and dissociable motivational processes (Balleine & 
Dickinson, 1998; Dickinson, Smith, & Mirenowicz, 2000). The first is the Pavlovian 
Motivational Process: CSs, discriminative stimuli or contexts, acquire motivational 
properties during action learning through a Pavlovian association with the outcome. 
Such stimuli endow motivational properties that depend directly on the current 
motivational value of the outcome. This process is also central in the incentive-
sensitization theory by Berridge and Robinson (2016) introduced before, and predicts 
that the motivational power of the cues updates automatically and immediately after a 
shift in the outcome value (Tindell et al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2009). The second 
motivational process at play is the Incentive Learning Process, which is based on the 
knowledge of the action-outcome relation. The important difference of the Incentive 
Learning Process from the Pavlovian Motivational Process is that in order to 
appropriately update the outcome value following a shift in the motivational state, it is 
necessary to experience the outcome in the new state. This would explain why 
motivational shifts do not affect directly the value of the outcome of an instrumental 
action (Balleine, 1992; Dickinson & Balleine, 1994; Holland, 2004; Wilson et al., 1981). 
Rather, motivational shifts have such effect only once the instrumental action is 
associated again with the outcome in the shifted state (Balleine, 1992). In other words, 
the incentive value of an outcome in a particular motivational state has to be learned. 
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This process, called incentive learning, allows adapting the behavior according to the 
change of values in the environment. The necessity of an incentive learning process 
might sound bizarre when applied to daily life, because when we are satiated apparently 
we do not remain hungry for all the foods that were not in the meal we just ate. 
However, it is worth noting that re-experiencing the outcome in an altered state of 
motivation is rather common in a natural environment, a condition that could take place 
also in the laboratory if the tests were not conducted in extinction. 
In the context of the previous findings reported in Experiment 5 and 7, a possible 
mechanism for re-modulating the incentive salience of reward cues is offered by the 
notion of incentive learning. Specifically, it might be possible that in order to attenuate 
the enduring and irrational effects generated by reward cues, one needs to re-associate 
the cues with the outcome in the new shifted motivational state, i.e. after the outcome 
devaluation. 
INCENTIVE LEARNING IN PAVLOVIAN MECHANISMS 
The appropriateness the Incentive Learning Process to interpret the persisting 
motivational effects of reward cues reported before might be questioned. Indeed, the 
process I have assumed to explain previous results is based on a Pavlovian mechanism, 
and the paradigms I have used, at least in the attentional domain, are not appropriated 
to investigate instrumental actions intended as being goal-directed (Dickinson & 
Balleine, 1994). For an instrumental action to be goal-directed, it is necessary to meet 
two criteria. First, the action-outcome contingency has to be represented, namely the 
agent needs to be aware of the consequences of its action. Second, the outcome has to be 
a goal for the agent. However, what I measured in the previous experiments is not 
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suitable to respect the two above-mentioned criteria. First, in the attentional domain the 
capture effect can be considered automatic and not the result of a cognitive strategy. 
Second, the test was administered as an irrelevant task, so the outcome was not a goal in 
such a context. Nevertheless, the boundary between Pavlovian incentive salience and 
cognitive expectation is not clear (Berridge, 2001). For example, it has been reported 
that the incentive learning mechanism is not always necessary to update an agent’s 
behavior toward the outcome (Rescorla, 1994; Shipley & Colwill, 1996). Moreover, the 
PIT experiment that I have reported together with previous similar evidence in the 
literature stands in contrast with the automaticity of value shift described in the 
Pavlovian Motivational Process (Berridge, 2012). 
Despite the theoretical models of motivational modulation and learning 
processes, it has to be acknowledge that the predictions make by such models are 
challenged in a number of cases that might be sufficiently consistent to venture some 
new hypothesis. The driving idea in the following experiments is that the persisting 
incentive salience of a reward cue, as expressed in its capacity to still bias attention after 
reward devaluation, can be attenuated by incentive learning, namely when one re-
experiences the association of that cue with the reward in the altered motivational state. 
In the following experiments, I operationalized the incentive learning as an additional 
session of conditioning with the same cue-reward relation, in a context of an altered 
motivational state in which the outcome has no value. Therefore, the next experiments 
were designed with this goal in mind: after thirsty participants underwent a 
conditioning phase, in which two cues signaled the reward with an associated high or 
low probability, they quenched their thirst (sensory specific reward devaluation). Then, 
participants were tested in an irrelevant visual search task in which target letters were 
embodied in the previous reward cues. According to the results of Experiment 5, 
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participants should be faster in responding to the target when presented within the 
former best reward cue, thus replicating evidence in favor of the irrational attentional 
capture. After this phase, in Experiment 9 participants underwent a second and equal 
conditioning, in which the same cues with the same associated probabilities signaled an 
outcome, this time with a low motivational value. Then, participants were tested again 
for attentional capture in the same visual search task. If incentive learning has a role in 
attenuating the cue motivational effect, then no or less attentional bias should emerge. 
In the hypothetical scenario of a lack of attentional bias, the null result could also be 
explained by the fact that between the first and the second visual search test the 
attentional bias may have vanished. Therefore, to control for a possible effect of time, a 
preliminary Experiment 8 was administered. In Experiment 8 the experimental scheme 
was the same of Experiment 9, except that the second conditioning was omitted, but 
allowing the comparable amount of time to pass between the two tests (see Figure 16). 
Experiment 8 could provide also more information about the duration of the irrational 
attentional bias. 
EXPERIMENT 8 
METHODS 
Participants 
Twenty-three undergraduate students (Mage = 21.0 years, 19 females) took part in 
the experiment after providing informed consent. They were asked not to drink for 
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about 4 hours prior to the experimental session. They received €5 compensation for 
their participation. 
Apparatus 
As in Experiment 1. 
Stimuli 
Conditioning phase 
As in Experiment 2, except that the cues were reduced to two, and assumed two 
of the same three equilluminant colors (red, green and cyan) in a balanced order across 
participants. 
Visual Search 
The compound-stimuli consisted of one L and one T (1.8° x 1.8°), which appeared 
randomly tilted to the left or to the right, each one inside a colored ring used as reward 
cue during the conditioning phase. The two compound stimuli were presented 
simultaneously and equally spaced (180°) on an imaginary circle (5° radius) centered on 
the screen. A fixation cross, inscribed in a circle with 0.5° diameter, appeared in the 
center of the screen. 
Procedure 
Similarly to Experiment 2, participants’ level of thirst was assessed verbally at the 
beginning of the experiment and participants were offered salty food to increase their 
level of thirst. They were asked to select their preferred beverage from a variety (from 
water to well-known sugary drinks) as reward. The amount of liquid reward that 
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dropped into the glass depended on their responses during the conditioning phase. 
Participants also performed a few practice trials using a gray cue with the 0.5 cue-
reward contingency before the experimental session. The experiment was divided into 
five phases (see Figure 16), and overall lasted about 50 min. 
Phase 1: Conditioning 
As in Experiment 2, except that the cues were reduced to two, each one 
associated with a high (p = .8) or low (p = .2) probability of predicting the beverage 
reward upon acceptance. The total number of trials was 160, and the available “accept” 
responses were 80. 
Phase 2: reward devaluation 
Participants were allowed to drink ad libitum the beverage they had chosen as 
reward during the conditioning phase, so that I specifically devalued the reward 
associated with the cue. They were encouraged to drink to quench their thirst. To 
evaluate their level of thirst, participants completed the same 3-item questionnaire 
administered in the previous experiments. 
Phase 3: first test 
The same visual search administered in Experiment 2, except that the choice was 
made on two compound stimuli and the total amount of trials was 120, divided into 2 
blocks of 60 trials. The target appeared within each colored ring in an equal number of 
trials. 
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Phase 4: waiting phase 
In order to control for the effect of time in a delayed measure of attentional 
capture, participants waited 15 minutes before starting the second test. The amount of 
time was determined by a pilot test in which the time for conditioning was measured 
and averaged. Participants in this phase remained sit in front of the screen, which 
showed a countdown of the time that remained to be waited. 
Phase 5: second test 
The same visual search test of Phase 3 was administered for the second time. 
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Figure 16. Phase diagram for Experiment 8 and 9 and physiological state relative to 
the beverage reward that corresponded to each phase. 
See Procedure for details. 
 
RESULTS 
Phase 1: Conditioning 
The analysis on RTs during the first conditioning were separated for “accept” and 
“reject” responses. For “accept” responses (outliers <2%), a paired t test showed that 
RTs in the p = .8 condition were significantly shorter than RTs in the p = .2 conditions, 
t(22) = 5.58, p < .001, d = 1.164, indicating that during the conditioning phase 
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participants were faster at deciding to accept the cue associated to the highest 
probability of reward. For “reject” responses, the same analysis revealed that RTs in the 
p = .8 condition were significantly higher than RTs in the p = .2 conditions, t(22) = -3.97, 
p < .001, d = -0.828, indicating that during the conditioning phase participants were 
faster at deciding to reject the cue associated to the lowest probability of reward. 
The analysis on the rate of responses of acceptance associated with the different 
cue showed that the response rate in the p = .8 condition was significantly higher than 
the response rate in the p = .2 conditions (paired t test), t(22) = -9.06, p < .001, d = -
1.888, indicating that the rate of acceptance of a cue increased with its contingency (see 
Figure 17 panel c). Given that a binary response (accept or reject) was always required, 
that indicates that the rate of refusal of a cue increased as its contingency decreased. 
The mean ratings of the cue-reward contingencies reported by participants on a 
10-point scale were the followings: for p = .2, M = 2.78, SD = 2.07; for p = .8, M = 6.78, SD 
= 2.04. No participant ranked the cue-reward contingency in the wrong order. 
Phase 2: reward devaluation 
Here I report the analysis on how participants rated their level of thirst before 
the beginning of the conditioning phase and after they drank to quench their thirst 
(before the beginning of the first visual search test). A Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
indicated that post-task ranks were significantly lower than the pre-task ranks for all the 
three items (Z = 276, p < .001; Z = 253, p < .001; Z = 276, p < .001 respectively). These 
results indicate that the devaluation procedure was successful. 
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Phase 3: first test 
A paired t test on RTs for correct responses (89.5%) in the first visual search test 
(outliers <2%) showed that RTs in the p = .8 condition were significantly shorter than 
RTs in the p = .2 conditions, t(22) = 3.33, p = .003, d = 0.694 (see Figure 17 panel a). 
A paired t test on accuracy across cues in the visual search task showed that 
accuracy in the p = .8 condition was not significantly different from accuracy in the p = .2 
conditions (p = .276). 
Phase 5: second test 
A paired t test on RTs for correct responses (93.0%) in the second visual search 
test (outliers <2%) showed that RTs in the p = .8 condition were significantly shorter 
than RTs in the p = .2 conditions, t(22) = 2.77, p = .011, d = 0.578 (see Figure 17 panel a). 
A paired t test on accuracy across cues in the visual search task showed that 
accuracy did not differ depending on whether the target was encircled within the p = .8 
or the p = .2 former cue (paired t test, p = .869). 
First vs. second test comparison 
In order to determine whether there was a difference between the results of the 
first and the second visual search test, a repeated measures ANOVA with Contingency (.2 
vs. .8) and Test (first vs. second) as within subject factors was computed and showed a 
significant main effect of Contingency, F(1, 22) = 21.03, p < .001, ηp
2  = .489, a significant 
main effect of Test, F(1, 22) = 22.54, p < .001, ηp
2  = .506, but no significant interaction 
between Contingency and Test (p = .930), indicating that in the second test participants 
were generally faster in detecting the target (see Figure 17 panel a), but the effect of 
attentional bias was not reduced by time. 
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Figure 17. Graphical representation of the results of Experiment 8 and 9. 
(a) Visual search RTs in Experiment 8 plotted as a function of cue-reward 
contingencies and test. (b) Visual search RTs in Experiment 9 plotted as a function 
of cue-reward contingencies and test. (c) “Accept” response rates in Experiment 8 
plotted as a function of cue-reward contingencies. (d) “Accept” response rates in 
Experiment 9 plotted as a function of cue-reward contingencies and conditioning 
phases (the second conditioning is referred to incentive learning). Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals for within-subjects designs (Cousineau, 2005). 
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DISCUSSION 
The results of the first visual search test successfully replicated the results 
reported in Experiment 5: the cues persisted in captivating participants’ attention 
despite the low value of the formerly predicted reward (as indicated by the ranks of the 
questionnaire). In addition, results also showed that the same cues continued to capture 
attention even in a delayed test. The analysis revealed that the interval between the two 
tests was ineffective in reducing the attentional bias, as suggested by the lack of any 
interaction between the Contingency and Test factors. The main effect of Test can be 
interpreted as the effect of training: indeed, participants were generally faster in 
detecting the target in the second test as compared to the first. 
The results of Experiment 8, therefore, can provide a reliable control for a further 
implementation of incentive learning in the experimental procedure, with the aim to 
disrupt or attenuate the persisting irrational attentional bias that reward-cues have 
shown to have gained. 
EXPERIMENT 9 
METHODS 
Participants 
Twenty-six undergraduate students (Mage = 24.2 years, 19 females) took part in 
the experiment after providing informed consent. They were asked not to drink for 
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about 4 hours prior to the experimental session. They received €5 compensation for 
their participation. 
Apparatus 
As in Experiment 1. 
Stimuli 
Conditioning phase 
As in Experiment 8. 
Visual Search 
As in Experiment 8. 
Procedure 
As in Experiment 8, except for Phase 4, in which participants underwent a second 
conditioning for incentive learning (see Figure 16). In order to associate the reward cues 
to the devalued outcome in a condition of physiological shift, the same conditioning of 
Phase 1 was repeated. 
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RESULTS 
Phase 1: Conditioning 
For “accept” responses (outliers <2%), a paired t test showed that RTs in the p = 
.8 condition were significantly shorter than RTs in the p = .2 conditions, t(24) = 2.46, p = 
.021, d = 0.493, indicating that during the first conditioning phase participants were 
faster at deciding to accept the cue associated to the highest probability of reward. For 
“reject” responses, the same analysis revealed that RTs in the two conditions did not 
differ significantly (p = .134), indicating that during the first conditioning phase 
participants’ speed in rejecting the cues was comparable across the probability of 
reward. 
The analysis on the rate of responses of acceptance associated with the different 
cue showed that the response rate in the p = .8 condition was significantly higher than 
the response rate in the p = .2 conditions (paired t test), t(25) = -9.43, p < .001, d = -
1.849, indicating that the rate of acceptance of a cue increased with its contingency (see 
Figure 17 panel d). This indicates that the rate of refusal of a cue increased as its 
contingency decreased. 
The mean ratings of the cue-reward contingencies reported by participants on a 
10-point scale were the followings: for p = .2, M = 2.31, SD = 1.49; for p = .8, M = 7.38, SD 
= 0.85. No participant ranked the cue-reward contingency in the wrong order. 
Phase 2: reward devaluation 
A Wilcoxon signed-rank test indicated that post-task ranks were significantly 
lower than the pre-task ranks for all the three items (Z = 351, p < .001; Z = 300, p < .001; 
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Z = 325, p < .001 respectively). These results indicate that the devaluation procedure 
was successful. 
Phase 3: first test 
A paired t test on RTs for correct responses (88.7%) in the first visual search test 
(outliers <2%) showed that RTs in the p = .8 condition were significantly shorter than 
RTs in the p = .2 conditions, t(25) = 2.17, p = .039, d = 0.426 (see Figure 17 panel b). 
A paired t test on accuracy across cues in the visual search task showed that 
accuracy in the p = .8 condition were significantly higher than accuracy in the p = .2 
conditions, t(25) = -2.22, p = .036, d = -0.435. 
Phase 4: incentive learning 
The analysis scheme in this phase is the same as the on administered in phase 1. 
For “accept” responses (outliers <3%), a paired t test showed that RTs in the p = .8 
condition were comparable to those in the p = .2 conditions (p = .613). Analogously, for 
“reject” responses the same analysis revealed that RTs in the two conditions did not 
differ significantly (p = .727), indicating that during incentive learning (i.e. the second 
conditioning phase) participants’ speed in accepting and rejecting the cues was 
comparable across the probability of reward. 
The rate of responses of acceptance did not differed between the two cues 
(paired t test, p = .365, see Figure 17 panel d), indicating that during incentive learning  
participants’ response attitude in accepting and rejecting the cues was comparable 
across the probability of reward. 
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Phase 5: second test 
A paired t test on RTs for correct responses (90.1%) in the first visual search test 
(outliers <2%) showed that RTs in the p = .8 condition were significantly shorter than 
RTs in the p = .2 conditions, t(25) = 2.87, p = .008, d = 0.564 (see Figure 17 panel b). 
A paired t test on accuracy across cues in the visual search task showed that 
accuracy did not differ depending on whether the target was encircled within the p = .8 
or the p = .2 former cue (paired t test, p = .313). 
First vs. second conditioning comparison 
As another index of motivation, it is interesting to analyze participants’ behavior 
in the two different conditioning session. A repeated measures ANOVA on acceptance 
response rates with Contingency (.2 vs. .8) and Conditioning (first vs. second) as within 
subject factors showed a significant main effect of Contingency, F(1, 25) = 14.66, p < 
.001, ηp
2  = .370, a significant main effect of Conditioning, F(1, 25) = 43.85, p < .001, ηp
2  = 
.637, and a significant interaction between Contingency and Conditioning, F(1, 25) = 
29.47, p < .001, ηp
2  = .541, indicating that participants acceptance attitude generally 
decreased, and was not different between the two cues in the second conditioning (see 
Figure 17 panel d). 
First vs. second test comparison 
A repeated measures ANOVA on visual search RTs with Contingency (.2 vs. .8) 
and Test (first vs. second) as within subject factors showed a significant main effect of 
Contingency, F(1, 25) = 7.72, p = .010, ηp
2  = .236, a significant main effect of Test, F(1, 25) 
= 7.85, p = .010, ηp
2  = .239, but no significant interaction between Contingency and Test 
(p = .674), indicating that the effect of attentional bias was not modulated or reduced by 
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the procedure of incentive learning that was implemented in Phase 4, despite in the 
second test participants were generally faster in detecting the target (see Figure 17). 
Between experiments comparison 
Given that Experiment 8 and 9 were administered following the same procedure 
except for incentive learning, it is possible to compute an analysis between the two 
experiments. A repeated measures ANOVA with Contingency (.2 vs. .8) and Test (first vs. 
second) as within subject factors and Experiment (Exp. 8 vs. Exp. 9) as a between 
subject factor showed a significant main effect of Contingency, F(1, 47) = 23.86, p < .001, 
ηp
2  = .337, a significant main effect of Test, F(1, 47) = 28.40, p < .001, ηp
2  = .337, but no 
significant main effect of Experiment (p = .329) or any significant interaction 
(Contingency X Test, p = .770; Contingency X Experiment, p = .587; Test X Experiment, p 
= .168; Contingency X Test X Experiment, p = .895 ). 
DISCUSSION 
The results of Experiment 9 suggest that reward cues continue to capture 
attention even after participants were submitted to an incentive learning procedure. 
Indeed, the attentional bias emerged both in the first and in the second test and was 
neither reduced nor modulated by the incentive learning manipulation, as suggested by 
the between test comparison. 
Because in this experiment each conditioning phase was administered in a 
different motivational state (Phase 1 and 4), it is worth commenting the difference 
between the two learning phases. The first conditioning in Phase 1 showed that 
participants were more likely to accept the best reward cue (p = .8) and were also faster 
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in doing so, as compared to the less reliable reward predictor (p = .2). This behavior is in 
line with the idea that participants were strongly motivated in maximizing the beverage 
reward. However, the identical conditioning of Phase 4 (that was implemented as a 
chance for a new incentive learning) provided a very different scenario: participants 
generally reduced their responding attitude and importantly, they did not differentiate 
their attitude between the two cues (nor did their speed in responding was different). 
This behavior suggests that participants were not motivated in obtaining the reward 
anymore, a hypothesis in line with the results of the thirst questionnaire. It is therefore 
plausible that the incentive learning procedure was appropriate in the sense that the 
cues were paired with the outcome in a condition of a low physiological state (i.e. a low 
motivational state) relative to the same outcome. Notwithstanding its appropriateness, 
the new incentive learning was not able to override the effects of the original learning 
phase by means of which an attentional bias in favor of the best reward cue predictor 
was established. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION  
The most important result of Experiment 8 and 9 is that the attentional attraction 
towards a reward cue can resist the combined effects of reward devaluation, time and 
incentive learning. I have already discussed in the previous chapters other cases in 
which reward cues exert their behavioral influence despite reward devaluation. 
Moreover, that a reward cue can capture attention even after some time has passed 
(here at least 15 min) is something that has been documented also in previous works: 
for example, it has been shown that the attentional capture effect can endure for weeks 
or even months after conditioning (Anderson et al., 2011; Anderson & Yantis, 2013). It is 
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worth noting, however, that Experiment 8 tested the lasting attentional effect in a 
context of reward devaluation, and thus provides new indications about the role of time 
in that context. However, the fact that incentive learning did not modulate the cue 
attentional-grabbing power is something that has never been reported. The results of 
Experiment 9 suggest that, surprisingly, incentive learning did not even reduce the 
effect. 
If the attentional bias is considered as an indicator of incentive salience 
(Anderson et al., 2017; M. J. F. Robinson, Fischer, Ahuja, Lesser, & Maniates, 2016), the 
data I have reported in this chapter can be interpreted as an additional example in 
which “wanting” can operate independently from one’s cognitive desire and liking. 
Indeed, here participants ranked the reward beverage as un-wanted and un-liked 
(although the validity of the questionnaire I have adopted in relation to the measures of 
wanting and liking can be questioned; see Chapter 4). Moreover, when the second 
conditioning is analyzed, it appears even more evident that participants were not 
interested in obtaining the beverage reward, because they deliberately changed their 
choice behavior towards the cues. In addition, even the speed of responses towards the 
cues during the second conditioning (both “accept” and “reject” responses) was 
comparable. Yet, the same cues were able to attract participants’ attention as a function 
of their previous reward associative strength. 
Another noteworthy element emerging from the second conditioning phase in 
Experiment 9 (i.e. the incentive learning manipulation) concerns the role of selection 
history in the attentional bias (Awh et al., 2012; Chapman et al., 2014). That is, the fact 
that the attentional bias I have reported is not due to a Pavlovian mechanisms that 
transfers motivational properties between the reward and the associated cue, but rather 
a consequence of a previous, repeated selection of one stimulus (i.e. the p = .8 cue) and 
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the previous rejection of the other stimulus (i.e. the p = .2 cue). This alternative 
possibility was already investigated in Chapter 2, and the results tend to safely exclude 
alternative account. As another element of exclusion, in Experiment 9 the attentional 
bias emerged in the second test even if the cue that captured attention was not 
preferentially chosen over the other in the previous incentive learning conditioning 
phase (if anything, it tended to be chosen less; see Figure 17, panel d). 
Finally, from the present experiments it is difficult to delineate the empirical 
boundary between the Pavlovian Motivational Process and the Incentive Learning 
Process. On one hand, the Pavlovian Motivational Process does not always seem to 
automatically affect the attentional bias. Indeed, the theoretical prediction of the 
Pavlovian Motivational Process (and the incentive salience model of Zhang et al., 2009) 
is that the attentional bias should immediately cease after reward devaluation. This 
prediction is at odds with the results of Experiment 5, 8 and 9. On the other hand, the 
role of the Incentive Learning Process in explaining the modulation of incentive salience 
can be questioned because such process involves instrumental goal-directed actions. To 
interpret the present results in light of the Incentive Learning Process, one must assume 
the attentional behavior towards a reward cue to be an instrumental action. Such 
assumption is arguably a stretch because the attentional capture is a rather automatic 
effect (i.e. the relation between the action and the outcome is not represented) and the 
outcome in the test phase was task-irrelevant (i.e. the outcome is not a goal for the 
agent). However, the appropriateness of the theoretical models has been challenged by a 
number of instances, including the phenomenon of the PIT in context in which reward is 
devalued (see Chapter 5). It is therefore plausible to allow a slight departure from the 
theoretical Incentive Learning Process in conceiving the hypothesis that incentive 
learning could be a factor in modulating the attentional capture generated by reward 
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cues, when the attentional capture is interpreted as a sign of incentive salience. 
However, such hypothesis is not supported by the results of Experiment 9, which are at 
odds with the theoretical prediction of the Incentive Learning Process, which suggests 
that the attentional bias should vanish after one has the possibility to experience the 
reward in the altered motivational state.  
The results presented in this chapter replicated the ones obtained in Experiment 
5: the attentional bias emerged in both Experiment 8 and 9 even after reward 
devaluation. In addition, the results showed that the attentional bias outlasted both the 
passage of time and a new learning phase in which there was a chance of directly re-
experience the association between the cues and their former valueless outcomes. 
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CHAPTER 7 
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
OVERVIEW 
The investigation of reward cues’ incentive salience from a behavioral 
perspective that I have reported in the present work delineates a quite intricate 
scenario. 
Reward cues can acquire quite rapidly the behavioral features that characterize 
the incentive salience, such as the capacity to bias attention and to evoke a motivational 
state that invigorates or instigates instrumental actions. A brief conditioning session is 
sufficient to endow a reward cue with the capacity to act as an attentional magnet that 
attracts attention and the eyes beyond conditioning. Specifically, the attractivity of a 
reward cue is governed by how reliably it predicted the outcome during associative 
learning as compared to other uncertain predictors (Chapter 2). I have also reported 
additional evidence that a PIT effect can be found in humans, and that PIT does not seem 
to be modulated by different types of reward palatability (Chapter 3). 
Surprisingly, such attributes of incentive salience seem to remain effective 
independently of outcome devaluation. Devaluing the reward by consummatory 
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satiation does not abolish the capacity of a reward cue to capture attention (Chapter 4), 
nor does it modulate the capacity of a reward cue to invigorate an instrumental action in 
the PIT effect (Chapter 5). The persistent salience of the cue is “irrational” when the 
associated outcome is no longer valuable, or to put it in terms of reward utility, the 
pursuit of a reward cue is not justified when the decision utility is greater than the 
predicted utility (Berridge & Aldridge, 2008). Hence, a kind of “irrational” behavior may 
have occurred in the experiments reported here, where the cue maintained its incentive 
ability to capture participants’ attention and to invigorate participants’ actions despite 
the associated reward was devalued. 
The persistence of incentive salience attributes after outcome devaluation is in 
line with Berridge’s suggestion (Berridge, 2012), according to which a persistent CS 
motivational power could be interpreted as a case in which the CS value detaches from 
the US value. Reasonably, in line with the view according to which agents learn to attend 
to motivationally relevant stimuli and to ignore motivationally irrelevant stimuli 
(Mackintosh, 1975), the cue attentional salience should be adjusted according to the 
new outcome value with a new conditioning phase. In line with this suggestion, 
Dickinson and Balleine (Balleine, 1992; Dickinson & Balleine, 1994) have proposed the 
notion of incentive learning, namely the fact that for the current drive state to affect the 
instrumental action, the reward needs to be experienced in the same drive state. 
Although this opportunity seems to be necessary for updating the value of the action-
outcome relation and to adapt the goal-directed performance accordingly (but see 
Rescorla, 1994; Shipley & Colwill, 1996), incentive learning seems not sufficient for 
abolishing the capacity of reward cues to capture attention once this has been 
established previously. Indeed, an “irrational” attentional bias towards a reward cue 
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seems to endure for long periods and to resist new formed associations between the cue 
and the previous outcome when devalued (Chapter 6). 
IMPLICATIONS 
In the context of incentive salience, a pivotal question remains unanswered. How 
does the incentive salience change according to the value of the associated reward? Or, 
to put it more generally, does the incentive salience of a reward cue change after it has 
been acquired? In the attempt to broaden the context of the results reported in the 
present work, I deem that providing an answer to this question might be of crucial 
importance to understand of how learning and motivation interact in determining 
behavior, a behavior that could easily come to be irrepressibly maladaptive. 
Drug addiction, for instance, is a circumstance in which a dissociation of the cue 
incentive salience from the outcome value is particularly evident. When in the 
appropriate K or physiological state, drug addicts can compulsively pursue and crave for 
drug cues even when the drug is neither pleasant nor cognitively wanted, a pathological 
condition well described by the incentive-sensitization theory of addiction (Berridge & 
Robinson, 1998, 2016, T. E. Robinson & Berridge, 1993, 2008). The social implications 
are quite impressive: a recent report claims that in the U.S.A. more than 1 person out of 
20 has a substance use disorder and approximately 135,000 deaths every year are 
attributed to drug abuse (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services & Office of the 
Surgeon General, 2016). 
Among other theories of addiction, such as the former major model of drive 
reduction theory or allostasis model of addiction, the incentive-sensitization theory of 
addiction encompasses more successfully the most recent empirical evidence (Berridge 
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& Robinson, 2016), although it is not yet acknowledged among health institutions 
(Badiani et al., 2017). A key aspect of this success is the notion that drugs of abuse (like 
cocaine, amphetamine, heroin, alcohol, nicotine, etc.) not only stimulate the dopamine 
mesolimbic system, but are also responsible for sensitization. Such dual effect is 
controversial in light of the drive reduction theory, and alludes back to the original 
experiments on rats’ brain stimulation pioneered by Olds and Milner (1954). Drive 
reduction theory posits that reward assumption satisfies and reduces an organism’ 
internal motivational drive, so the reward is pursued to reach the homeostasis of the 
system. However, it was striking to observe that drive and reward assumption might 
reflect the same state, rather than the opposite: indeed, the brain sites where 
stimulation incites behavior largely overlap with the sites where stimulation is 
rewarding (Berridge, 2001; Kringelbach & Berridge, 2016; Olds & Milner, 1954). In 
addition, stimulation of these brain sites is likely not accompanied by any hedonic 
experience (Berridge & Kringelbach, 2008; Johansen, 2005; Portenoy, Jarden, Sidtis, & 
Lipton, 1986). This have led to alternative explanations that are best reconciled in the 
most recent incentive-sensitization theory. 
The mechanism of sensitization of the brain mesolimbic system holds a central 
role in the incentive-sensitization theory, and is likely a consequence of repeated drug 
assumption. Sensitization is physically expressed by an increased release of dopamine 
and by a modification of mesolimbic neurons. Functionally, a sensitized brain is hyper-
reactive to the incentive motivational properties of drug cues (including contexts), and 
stimulates abnormally and compulsively the “wanting” for drugs, even in the absence of 
liking for the drug. Surprisingly, sensitization is triggered rather easily: to engage the 
mechanism is sufficient to assume low doses of drugs even in subjects with no history of 
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drug usage (Boileau et al., 2006). Moreover, once developed sensitization is long lasting, 
and in some cases even permanent, and this is what makes drug use very dangerous. 
Among rehab circles, there is a saying: “once addicted always addicted”. A recent 
report in the U.S.A. claims that “more than 60 percent of people treated for a substance 
use disorder experience relapse within the first year after they are discharged from 
treatment, and a person can remain at increased risk of relapse for many years” (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services & Office of the Surgeon General, 2016, pp. 2–
2). However, there are multiple factors that discredit that hopeless saying. First of all, it 
has to be noted that most people who try drugs never develop an addiction (e.g. in the 
case of cocaine, long-term addicts are roughly 30%). Moreover, in addition to social and 
environmental factors, individual variability may play a key role in the development of 
addiction. Individual variability can be determined by genetic factors, gender, major 
stresses and neuropsychological traits that combined can affect the susceptibility of the 
mesolimbic sensitization (Berridge & Robinson, 2016; M. J. F. Robinson, Robinson, & 
Berridge, 2013). Individual variability is particularly evident in the laboratory controlled 
settings of animal studies (Flagel, Akil, & Robinson, 2009). 
Interestingly, it has been proposed that everyone in normal life is, to some extent, 
affected by addiction-like mechanisms. Common desires that span from basic hungers to 
more complex feelings of love, guide various forms of cue-reward learning that share 
addictive-like mechanisms (Berridge, 2017; Berridge & Robinson, 2016; Pitchers et al., 
2013). Although the magnitude of sensitization in addicts might rely on a different 
scaling, the idea of a common mechanisms and a shared brain substrate suggests that 
addiction may develop independently of the power of a substance (i.e. drugs). For 
example, overeating and binge-eating that characterize obesity can be considered as 
addiction for food (Davis & Carter, 2009; Gearhardt, Yokum, Stice, Corbin, & Brownell, 
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2011; Schulte et al., 2015). Even more, addiction may develop even if there is no 
consumption of chemical substances (Leeman & Potenza, 2013). Indeed, several forms 
of addiction unrelated to drugs have been described recently, with the similar 
characteristic of hyper-reactivity to related cues (Grant, Brewer, & Potenza, 2006; Olsen, 
2011). For example, individuals with compulsive sexual behavior (CSB; a form of 
“behavioral” addiction) show greater engagement of limbic circuitry to sexual cues 
compared to healthy individuals (Voon et al., 2014). Gambling is another form of widely-
recognized form of addiction: individuals with gambling disorder show an increased 
brain response in reward-related areas to gambling cues (Limbrick-Oldfield et al., 2017). 
Compulsive gambling, together with other compulsive behaviors, is also commonly 
developed in Parkinson’s patients as an adverse effect that is likely caused by the 
sensitization of the neural response to non-drug rewards by dopaminergic medication 
which artificially elevates the dopamine response in the brain  (O’Sullivan et al., 2011; 
Ray et al., 2012). Perhaps the most striking form of drug-free addiction is a recent 
addiction that has developed along with the diffusion of internet accessibility: the 
abundant and arousing contents of internet and related social media can determine a 
compulsive internet use that leads to dependence and other psychological distress 
(Brand, Young, & Laier, 2014; Love, Laier, Brand, Hatch, & Hajela, 2015). Internet 
addiction disorder (IAD) is alarmingly spreading facing a lack of dedicated research and 
the absence of any evidence-based treatment. In China, specific training camps have 
developed with the aim to dissuade adolescents from internet abuse, and media have 
reported the contingent death of at least one teenager (Cash, Rae, Steel, & Winkler, 2012; 
Weinstein & Lejoyeux, 2010). 
If the mechanism that underlies addiction matches other more ordinary forms of 
motivated learning (Nestler, 2005; Olsen, 2011; Pitchers et al., 2013), and if the 
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motivational properties of a reward cue are manifested in their ability to impair 
attention and to elicit motivational states that spur the pursue of reward and incite 
action (Berridge & Robinson, 2016), the behavioral effects of motivational learning 
reported in the present work can be linked to addiction, and can deepen our 
understanding of the basic mechanisms that can influence its development. On the basis 
of the present results suggesting an “irrational” persistence of behavioral impairments 
induced by reward cues encounter, unveiling the basic mechanisms in action could also 
help to shed light on how such behavioral impairments could be reduced or 
extinguished. This line of research is of particular interest, also considering the low 
reliability of the currently available treatments for addictive disorders (such as twelve-
step programs, cognitive-behavioral therapy or mindfulness; Badiani et al., 2017; 
Berridge, 2017; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) & Office of the 
Surgeon General, 2016), and might have pervasive social implications (Berridge, 2017). 
  
 129 
REFERENCES 
Allman, M. J., DeLeon, I. G., Cataldo, M. F., Holland, P. C., & Johnson, A. W. (2010). Learning 
processes affecting human decision making: An assessment of reinforcer-selective 
Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer following reinforcer devaluation. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology. Animal Behavior Processes, 36(3), 402–8. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/a0017876 
Anderson, B. A., & Halpern, M. (2017). On the value-dependence of value-driven 
attentional capture. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics. 
http://doi.org/10.3758/s13414-017-1289-6 
Anderson, B. A., Kuwabara, H., Wong, D. F., Roberts, J., Rahmim, A., Brašić, J. R., & 
Courtney, S. M. (2017). Linking dopaminergic reward signals to the development of 
attentional bias: A positron emission tomographic study. NeuroImage, 157, 27–33. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2017.05.062 
Anderson, B. A., Laurent, P. a, & Yantis, S. (2011). Value-driven attentional capture. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 
108(25), 10367–10371. http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1104047108 
Anderson, B. A., & Yantis, S. (2012). Value-driven attentional and oculomotor capture 
during goal- directed, unconstrained viewing. Attention, Perception & Psychophysics, 
1644–1653. http://doi.org/10.3758/s13414-012-0348-2 
Anderson, B. A., & Yantis, S. (2013). Persistence of value-driven attentional capture. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 39(1), 6–9. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/a0030860 
 130 
Avena, N. M., & Hoebel, B. G. (2003). A diet promoting sugar dependency causes 
behavioral cross-sensitization to a low dose of amphetamine. Neuroscience, 122(1), 
17–20. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0306-4522(03)00502-5 
Awh, E., Belopolsky, A. V., & Theeuwes, J. (2012). Top-down versus bottom-up 
attentional control: A failed theoretical dichotomy. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 
16(8), 437–443. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2012.06.010 
Badiani, A., Berridge, K. C., Heilig, M., Nutt, D. J., & Robinson, T. E. (2017). Addiction 
research and theory: A commentary on the Surgeon General’s Report on alcohol, 
drugs, and health. Addiction Biology. http://doi.org/10.1111/adb.12497 
Balleine, B. (1992). Instrumental performance following a shift in primary motivation 
depends on incentive learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Animal Behavior 
Processes, 18(3), 236–250. http://doi.org/10.1037/0097-7403.18.3.236 
Balleine, B., & Dickinson, A. (1998). Goal-Directed Instrumental Action : Contingency and 
Incentive Learning and Their Cortical Substrates. Neuropharmacology, 37(4–5), 
407–419. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0028-3908(98)00033-1 
Balleine, B., & Ostlund, S. B. (2007). Still at the choice-point: Action selection and 
initiation in instrumental conditioning. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 
1104, 147–171. http://doi.org/10.1196/annals.1390.006 
Beesley, T., Nguyen, K. P., Pearson, D., & Le Pelley, M. E. (2015). Uncertainty and 
predictiveness determine attention to cues during human associative learning. The 
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 2(September), 1–25. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2015.1009919 
Berridge, K. C. (2001). Reward learning: Reinforcement , Incentives, and Expectations. 
 131 
Psychology of Learning and Motivation - Advances in Research and Theory, 40, 223–
278. 
Berridge, K. C. (2012). From prediction error to incentive salience: Mesolimbic 
computation of reward motivation. European Journal of Neuroscience, 35(7), 1124–
1143. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-9568.2012.07990.x 
Berridge, K. C. (2017). Is Addiction a Brain Disease? Neuroethics, 10(1), 29–33. 
http://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-016-9286-3 
Berridge, K. C., & Aldridge, J. W. (2008). Decision utility , the brain , and pursuit of 
hedonic goals. Social Cognition, 26(5), 621–646. 
http://doi.org/10.1521/soco.2008.26.5.621 
Berridge, K. C., & Kringelbach, M. L. (2008). Affective neuroscience of pleasure: Reward 
in humans and animals. Psychopharmacology, 199(3), 457–480. 
http://doi.org/10.1007/s00213-008-1099-6 
Berridge, K. C., & Robinson, T. E. (1998). What is the role of dopamine in reward: 
hedonic impact, reward learning, or incentive salience? Brain Research Reviews, 
28(3), 309–69. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-0173(98)00019-8 
Berridge, K. C., & Robinson, T. E. (2003). Parsing reward. Trends in Neurosciences, 26(9), 
507–13. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0166-2236(03)00233-9 
Berridge, K. C., & Robinson, T. E. (2016). Liking, wanting, and the incentive-sensitization 
theory of addiction. American Psychologist, 71(8), 670–679. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/amp0000059 
Berridge, K. C., Robinson, T. E., & Aldridge, J. W. (2009). Dissecting components of 
reward: “liking”, “wanting”, and learning. Current Opinion in Pharmacology, 9(1), 
 132 
65–73. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.coph.2008.12.014 
Bindra, D. (1978). How adaptive behavior is produced: a perceptual-motivational 
alternative to response-reinforcement. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1(1), 41–91. 
http://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00059380 
Boileau, I., Dagher, A., Leyton, M., Gunn, R., Baker, G., Diksic, M., & Benkelfat, C. (2006). 
Modeling Sensitization to Stimulants in Humans. Archives of General Psychiatry, 63, 
1386–1395. http://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10 .1001/archpsyc.63.12.1386 
Bouton, M. E. (2011). Learning and the persistence of appetite: Extinction and the 
motivation to eat and overeat. Physiology and Behavior, 103(1), 51–58. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.physbeh.2010.11.025 
Brand, M., Young, K. S., & Laier, C. (2014). Prefrontal Control and Internet Addiction: A 
Theoretical Model and Review of Neuropsychological and Neuroimaging Findings. 
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8(May), 1–13. 
http://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2014.00375 
Bray, S., Rangel, A., Shimojo, S., Balleine, B., & O’Doherty, J. P. (2008). The neural 
mechanisms underlying the influence of pavlovian cues on human decision making. 
The Journal of Neuroscience, 28(22), 5861–6. 
http://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0897-08.2008 
Bucker, B., & Theeuwes, J. (2017). Pavlovian reward learning underlies value driven 
attentional capture. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 79, 1–14. 
http://doi.org/10.3758/s13414-016-1241-1 
Cabanac, M. (1979). Sensory pleasure. The Quarterly Review of Biology, 54(1), 1–29. 
Cartoni, E., Balleine, B., & Baldassarre, G. (2016). Appetitive Pavlovian-instrumental 
 133 
Transfer: A review. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 71, 829–848. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2016.09.020 
Cartoni, E., Moretta, T., Puglisi-allegra, S., Cabib, S., & Baldassarre, G. (2015). The 
relationship between specific pavlovian instrumental transfer and instrumental 
reward probability. Frontiers in Psychology, 6(NOV), 1–7. 
http://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01697 
Cash, H., Rae, C. D., Steel, A. H., & Winkler, A. (2012). Internet Addiction: A Brief 
Summary of Research and Practice. Current Psychiatry Reviews, 8(4), 292–298. 
http://doi.org/10.2174/157340012803520513 
Chapman, C. S., Gallivan, J. P., & Enns, J. T. (2014). Separating value from selection 
frequency in rapid reaching biases to visual targets. Visual Cognition, (December), 
1–23. http://doi.org/10.1080/13506285.2014.976604 
Chelazzi, L., Perlato, A., Santandrea, E., & Della Libera, C. (2013). Rewards teach visual 
selective attention. Vision Research, 85, 58–62. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.visres.2012.12.005 
Chen, L., Cheng, Y., Zhou, W., & Mustain, W. D. (2014). Monetary reward speeds up 
voluntary saccades. Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience, 8(June), 48. 
http://doi.org/10.3389/fnint.2014.00048 
Chen, L., Hung, L. Y., Quinet, J., & Kosek, K. (2013). Cognitive regulation of saccadic 
velocity by reward prospect. European Journal of Neuroscience, 38(3), 2434–2444. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/ejn.12247 
Colagiuri, B., & Lovibond, P. F. (2015). How food cues can enhance and inhibit 
motivation to obtain and consume food. Appetite, 84, 79–87. 
 134 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.appet.2014.09.023 
Colwill, R. M., & Rescorla, R. A. (1990). Effect of reinforcer devaluation on discriminative 
control of instrumental behavior. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal 
Behavior Processes, 16(1), 40–47. http://doi.org/10.1037/0097-7403.16.1.40 
Corbit, L. H., Janak, P. H., & Balleine, B. (2007). General and outcome-specific forms of 
Pavlovian-instrumental transfer: The effect of shifts in motivational state and 
inactivation of the ventral tegmental area. European Journal of Neuroscience, 26(11), 
3141–3149. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-9568.2007.05934.x 
Cousineau, D. (2005). Confidence intervals in within-subject designs: A simpler solution 
to Loftus and Masson’s method. Tutorials in Quantitative Methods for Psychology, 
1(1), 42–45. 
Cousineau, D. (2010). Outliers detection and treatment : a review . International Journal 
of Psychological Research, 3(1), 58–67. 
Davis, C., & Carter, J. C. (2009). Compulsive overeating as an addiction disorder. A review 
of theory and evidence. Appetite, 53(1), 1–8. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.appet.2009.05.018 
Dickinson, A., & Balleine, B. (1994). Motivational control of goal-directed action. Animal 
Learning & Behavior, 22(1), 1–18. http://doi.org/10.3758/BF03199951 
Dickinson, A., & Balleine, B. (2002). The role of learning in the operation of motivational 
systems. Steven’s Handbook of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Motivation and 
Emotion, 3, 497–534. http://doi.org/10.1002/0471214426.pas0312 
Dickinson, A., Smith, J. C., & Mirenowicz, J. (2000). Dissociation of Pavlovian and 
instrumental incentive learning under dopamine antagonists. Behavioral 
 135 
Neuroscience, 114(3), 468–483. http://doi.org/10.1037/0735-7044.114.3.468 
Eder, A. B., & Dignath, D. (2016a). Asymmetrical effects of posttraining outcome 
revaluation on outcome-selective Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer of control in 
human adults. Learning and Motivation, 54, 12–21. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.lmot.2016.05.002 
Eder, A. B., & Dignath, D. (2016b). Cue-elicited food seeking is eliminated with aversive 
outcomes following outcome devaluation. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 69(3), 574–588. http://doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2015.1062527 
Esber, G. R., & Haselgrove, M. (2011). Reconciling the influence of predictiveness and 
uncertainty on stimulus salience: a model of attention in associative learning. 
Proceedings. Biological Sciences / The Royal Society, 278(1718), 2553–2561. 
http://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2011.0836 
Failing, M. F., Nissens, T., Pearson, D., Pelley, M. Le, & Theeuwes, J. (2015). Oculomotor 
capture by stimuli that signal the availability of reward. Journal of Neurophysiology, 
114(4), 2316–2327. http://doi.org/10.1152/jn.00441.2015 
Failing, M. F., & Theeuwes, J. (2014). Exogenous visual orienting by reward. Journal of 
Vision, 14(2014), 1–9. http://doi.org/10.1167/14.5.6.doi 
Field, M., & Cox, W. M. (2008). Attentional bias in addictive behaviors: A review of its 
development, causes, and consequences. Drug and Alcohol Dependence, 97(1–2), 1–
20. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.drugalcdep.2008.03.030 
Fiorillo, C. D., Tobler, P. N., & Schultz, W. (2003). Discrete Coding of Reward Dopamine 
Neurons. Science, 299(March), 1898–1902. 
http://doi.org/10.1126/science.1077349 
 136 
Flagel, S. B., Akil, H., & Robinson, T. E. (2009). Individual differences in the attribution of 
incentive salience to reward-related cues: Implications for addiction. 
Neuropharmacology, 56(SUPPL. 1), 139–148. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropharm.2008.06.027 
Gearhardt, A. N., Yokum, S., Stice, E., Corbin, W. R., & Brownell, K. D. (2011). Neural 
Correlates of Food Addiction. Arch Gen Psychiatry, 68(8), 808,816. 
http://doi.org/10.1001/archgenpsychiatry.2011.32 
Grant, J. E., Brewer, J. A., & Potenza, M. N. (2006). The neurobiology of substance and 
behavioral addictions. CNS Spectrums, 11(December), 924–930. 
http://doi.org/10.3109/00952990.2010.491884 
Haselgrove, M., Aydin, A., & Pearce, J. M. (2004). A partial reinforcement extinction effect 
despite equal rates of reinforcement during Pavlovian conditioning. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology. Animal Behavior Processes, 30(3), 240–250. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0097-7403.30.3.240 
Hickey, C., & Van Zoest, W. (2012). Reward creates oculomotor salience. Current Biology, 
22(7). http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2012.02.007 
Hogarth, L., & Chase, H. W. (2011). Parallel goal-directed and habitual control of human 
drug-seeking: implications for dependence vulnerability. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology. Animal Behavior Processes, 37(3), 261–276. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/a0022913 
Hogarth, L., Dickinson, A., Austin, A., Brown, C., & Duka, T. (2008). Attention and 
expectation in human predictive learning: the role of uncertainty. Quarterly Journal 
of Experimental Psychology (2006), 61(11), 1658–68. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/17470210701643439 
 137 
Holland, P. C. (2004). Relations between Pavlovian-instrumental transfer and reinforcer 
devaluation. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Animal Behavior Processes, 30(2), 
104–17. http://doi.org/10.1037/0097-7403.30.2.104 
Holmes, N. M., Marchand, A. R., & Coutureau, E. (2010). Pavlovian to instrumental 
transfer: A neurobehavioural perspective. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 
34(8), 1277–1295. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2010.03.007 
Johansen, E. B. (2005). Exploring Reinforcement Processes using Intra-Cranial Self-
Stimulation. Convergence. Interdisciplinary Communications 2004/2005, 115–120. 
Retrieved from http://www.cas.uio.no/Publications/Seminar/Convergence.pdf 
Kendig, M. D., Cheung, A. M. K., Raymond, J. S., & Corbit, L. H. (2016). Contexts Paired 
with Junk Food Impair Goal-Directed Behavior in Rats: Implications for Decision 
Making in Obesogenic Environments. Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience, 
10(November), 216. http://doi.org/10.3389/fnbeh.2016.00216 
Knight, D. C., Nguyen, H. T., & Bandettini, P. A. (2003). Expression of conditional fear with 
and without awareness. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 100(25), 
15280–15283. http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2535780100 
Konorski, J. (1967). Integrative activity of the brain; an interdisciplinary approach. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Kringelbach, M. L., & Berridge, K. C. (2016). Neuroscience of Reward, Motivation, and 
Drive. In Recent Developments in Neuroscience Research on Human Motivation (pp. 
23–35). http://doi.org/10.1108/S0749-742320160000019020 
Le Pelley, M. E. (2004). The role of associative history in models of associative learning: a 
selective review and a hybrid model. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
 138 
Psychology. B, Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 57(3), 193–243. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/02724990344000141 
Le Pelley, M. E., Mitchell, C. J., Beesley, T., George, D. N., & Wills, A. J. (2016). Attention 
and Associative Learning in Humans: An Integrative Review. Psychological Bulletin, 
142(10), 1–31. http://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000064 
Le Pelley, M. E., Pearson, D., Griffiths, O., & Beesley, T. (2015). When goals conflict with 
values: Counterproductive attentional and oculomotor capture by reward-related 
stimuli. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 144(1), 158–171. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000037 
Leeman, R. F., & Potenza, M. N. (2013). A targeted review of the neurobiology and 
genetics of behavioural addictions: An emerging area of research. Canadian Journal 
of Psychiatry, 58(5), 260–273. http://doi.org/10.1177/070674371305800503 
Limbrick-Oldfield, E. H., Mick, I., Cocks, R. E., McGonigle, J., Sharman, S., Goldstone, A. P., 
… Clark, L. (2017). Neural substrates of cue reactivity and craving in Gambling 
Disorder. Translational Psychiatry, (October 2016), 1–10. 
http://doi.org/10.1038/tp.2016.256 
Linnet, J., Mouridsen, K., Peterson, E., Møller, A., Doudet, D. J., & Gjedde, A. (2012). Striatal 
dopamine release codes uncertainty in pathological gambling. Psychiatry Research - 
Neuroimaging, 204(1), 55–60. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.pscychresns.2012.04.012 
Love, T., Laier, C., Brand, M., Hatch, L., & Hajela, R. (2015). Neuroscience of Internet 
Pornography Addiction: A Review and Update. Behavioral Sciences (Basel, 
Switzerland), 5(3), 388–433. http://doi.org/10.3390/bs5030388 
Lovibond, P. F. (2003). Causal beliefs and conditioned responses: Retrospective 
 139 
revaluation induced by experience and by instruction. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 29(1), 97–106. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.29.1.97 
Lovibond, P. F., & Shanks, D. R. (2002). The role of awareness in Pavlovian conditioning: 
Empirical evidence and theoretical implications. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Animal Behavior Processes, 28(1), 3–26. http://doi.org/10.1037/0097-7403.28.1.3 
Luque, D., Vadillo, M. A., Le Pelley, M. E., & Beesley, T. (2016). Prediction and uncertainty 
in associative learning : Examining controlled and automatic components of learned 
attentional biases, 218(May). http://doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2016.1188407 
Mackintosh, N. J. (1975). A theory of attention: Variations in the associability of stimuli 
with reinforcement. Psychological Review, 82(4), 276–298. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/h0076778 
Mastropasqua, T., & Turatto, M. (2015). Attention is necessary for subliminal 
instrumental conditioning. Nature Publishing Group, 1–7. 
http://doi.org/10.1038/srep12920 
Mine, C., & Saiki, J. (2015). Task-irrelevant stimulus-reward association induces value-
driven attentional capture. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 1896–1907. 
http://doi.org/10.3758/s13414-015-0894-5 
Nestler, E. J. (2005). Is there a common molecular pathway for addiction? Nature 
Neuroscience, 8(11), 1445–9. http://doi.org/10.1038/nn1578 
O’Sullivan, S. S., Wu, K., Politis, M., Lawrence, A. D., Evans, A. H., Bose, S. K., … Piccini, P. 
(2011). Cue-induced striatal dopamine release in Parkinson’s disease-associated 
impulsive-compulsive behaviours. Brain, 134(4), 969–978. 
 140 
http://doi.org/10.1093/brain/awr003 
Olds, J., & Milner, P. (1954). Positive reinforcement produced by electrical stimulation of 
septal area and other regions of rat brain. Journal of Comparative and Physiological 
Psychology. http://doi.org/10.1037/h0058775 
Olsen, C. M. (2011). Natural rewards, neuroplasticity, and non-drug addictions. 
Neuropharmacology, 61(7), 1109–1122. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropharm.2011.03.010 
Pearce, J. M., & Bouton, M. E. (2001). Theories of associative learning in animals. Annual 
Review of Psychology, 52, 111–139. http://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.52.1.111 
Pearce, J. M., & Hall, G. (1980). A model for Pavlovian learning: variations in the 
effectiveness of conditioned but not of unconditioned stimuli. Psychological Review, 
87(6), 532–52. http://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.87.6.532 
Pearson, D., Donkin, C., Tran, S. C., Most, S. B., & Le Pelley, M. E. (2015). Cognitive control 
and counterproductive oculomotor capture by reward-related stimuli. Visual 
Cognition, 6285(May 2015), 1–26. http://doi.org/10.1080/13506285.2014.994252 
Pelli, D. G. (1997). The VideoToolbox software for visual psychophysics: transforming 
numbers into movies. Spatial Vision. http://doi.org/10.1163/156856897X00366 
Pessiglione, M., Petrovic, P., Daunizeau, J., Palminteri, S., Dolan, R. J., & Frith, C. D. (2008). 
Subliminal Instrumental Conditioning Demonstrated in the Human Brain. Neuron, 
59(4), 561–567. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2008.07.005 
Piech, R. M., Pastorino, M. T., & Zald, D. H. (2010). All I saw was the cake. Hunger effects 
on attentional capture by visual food cues. Appetite, 54(3), 579–582. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.appet.2009.11.003 
 141 
Pitchers, K. K., Vialou, V., Nestler, E. J., Laviolette, S. R., Lehman, M. N., & Coolen, L. M. 
(2013). Natural and drug rewards act on common neural plasticity mechanisms 
with ΔFosB as a key mediator. Journal of Neuroscience, 33(8), 3434–42. 
http://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4881-12.2013 
Pool, E., Brosch, T., Delplanque, S., & Sander, D. (2014). Where is the chocolate? Rapid 
spatial orienting toward stimuli associated with primary rewards. Cognition, 
130(3), 348–59. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2013.12.002 
Pool, E., Brosch, T., Delplanque, S., & Sander, D. (2015). Stress Increases Cue-Triggered “ 
Wanting ” for Sweet Reward in Humans. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 41(2), 
128–136. http://doi.org/10.1037/xan0000052 
Pool, E., Sennwald, V., Delplanque, S., Brosch, T., & Sander, D. (2016). Measuring wanting 
and liking from animals to humans: A systematic review. Neuroscience and 
Biobehavioral Reviews, 63, 124–142. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2016.01.006 
Portenoy, R., Jarden, J., Sidtis, J., & Lipton, R. (1986). Compulsive thalamic self-
stimulation: a case with metabolic, electrophysiologic and behavioral correlates. 
Pain, 27, 277–290. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0304395986901557 
Preuschoff, K., Bossaerts, P., & Quartz, S. R. (2006). Neural differentiation of expected 
reward and risk in human subcortical structures. Neuron, 51(3), 381–90. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2006.06.024 
Ray, N. J., Miyasaki, J. M., Zurowski, M., Ko, J. H., Cho, S. S., Pellecchia, G., … Strafella, A. P. 
(2012). Extrastriatal dopaminergic abnormalities of DA homeostasis in Parkinson’s 
patients with medication-induced pathological gambling: A [11C] FLB-457 and PET 
 142 
study. Neurobiology of Disease, 48(3), 519–525. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.nbd.2012.06.021 
Rescorla, R. A. (1994). Transfer of instrumental control mediated by a devalued 
outcome. Animal Learning & Behavior, 22(1), 27–33. 
http://doi.org/10.3758/BF03199953 
Rescorla, R. A., & Wagner,  a R. (1972). A theory of Pavlovian conditioning: Variations in 
the effectiveness of reinforcement and nonreinforcement. Classical Conditioning II 
Current Research and Theory, 21(6), 64–99. http://doi.org/10.1101/gr.110528.110 
Robinson, M. J. F., Anselme, P., Fischer, A. M., & Berridge, K. C. (2014). Initial uncertainty 
in Pavlovian reward prediction persistently elevates incentive salience and extends 
sign-tracking to normally unattractive cues. Behavioural Brain Research, 266, 119–
30. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.bbr.2014.03.004 
Robinson, M. J. F., Anselme, P., Suchomel, K., & Berridge, K. C. (2015). Amphetamine-
Induced Sensitization and Reward Uncertainty Similarly Enhance Incentive Salience 
for Conditioned Cues. Behavioral Neuroscience, No Pagination Specified. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/bne0000064 
Robinson, M. J. F., & Berridge, K. C. (2013). Instant transformation of learned repulsion 
into motivational “wanting.” Current Biology, 23(4), 282–289. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2013.01.016 
Robinson, M. J. F., Fischer, A. M., Ahuja, A., Lesser, E. N., & Maniates, H. (2016). Roles of 
“wanting” and “liking” in motivating behavior: Gambling, food, and drug addictions. 
Current Topics in Behavioral Neurosciences, 27, 105–136. 
Robinson, M. J. F., Robinson, T. E., & Berridge, K. C. (2013). Incentive Salience and the 
 143 
Transition to Addiction. Biological Research on Addiction, (December), 391–399. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-398335-0.00039-X 
Robinson, M. J. F., Robinson, T. E., & Berridge, K. C. (2014). Incentive Salience in 
Addiction and Over-Consumption. The Interdisciplinary Science of Consumption, 
(September 2016), 185–197. 
Robinson, T. E., & Berridge, K. C. (1993). The neural basis of drug craving: An incentive-
sensitization theory of addiction. Brain Research Reviews, 18(3), 247–291. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/0165-0173(93)90013-P 
Robinson, T. E., & Berridge, K. C. (2008). Review. The incentive sensitization theory of 
addiction: some current issues. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of 
London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 363(1507), 3137–3146. 
http://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2008.0093 
Rolls, B. J., Wood, R. J., Rolls, E. T., Lind, H., Lind, W., & Ledingham, J. G. (1980). Thirst 
following water deprivation in humans. The American Journal of Physiology, 239(5), 
R476-82. Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/7001928 
Sali, A. W., Anderson, B. A., & Yantis, S. (2014). The Role of reward prediction in the 
control of attention. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Human Perception and 
Performance. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0037267 
Schulte, E. M., Avena, N. M., & Gearhardt, A. N. (2015). Which foods may be addictive? 
The roles of processing, fat content, and glycemic load. PLoS ONE, 10(2), 1–18. 
http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0117959 
Schultz, W. (1998). Predictive reward signal of dopamine neurons. Journal of 
Neurophysiology, 80(1), 1–27. http://doi.org/10.1007/s00429-010-0262-0 
 144 
Schultz, W. (2006). Behavioral theories and the neurophysiology of reward. Annual 
Review of Psychology, 57, 87–115. 
http://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.56.091103.070229 
Schwartz, B., & Williams, D. R. (1972). The role of the response-reinforcer contingency in 
negative automaintenance. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 3(3), 
351–357. http://doi.org/10.1901/jeab.1972.17-351 
Sha, L. Z., & Jiang, Y. (2015). Components of reward-driven attentional capture. 
Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, (December 2015), 403–414. 
http://doi.org/10.3758/s13414-015-1038-7 
Shanks, D. R. (2010). Learning: from association to cognition. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 61, 273–301. http://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.093008.100519 
Shipley, B. E., & Colwill, R. M. (1996). Direct effects on instrumental performance of 
outcome revaluation by drive shifts. Animal Learning & Behavior, 24(1), 57–67. 
http://doi.org/10.3758/BF03198954 
Smith, K. S., Berridge, K. C., & Aldridge, J. W. (2011). Disentangling pleasure from 
incentive salience and learning signals in brain reward circuitry. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 108(27), E255-64. 
http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1101920108 
Stouffer, M. A., Woods, C. A., Patel, J. C., Lee, C. R., Witkovsky, P., Bao, L., … Rice, M. E. 
(2015). Insulin enhances striatal dopamine release by activating cholinergic 
interneurons and thereby signals reward. Nature Communications, 6, 8543. 
http://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms9543 
Talmi, D., Seymour, B., Dayan, P., & Dolan, R. J. (2008). Human pavlovian-instrumental 
 145 
transfer. The Journal of Neuroscience : The Official Journal of the Society for 
Neuroscience, 28(2), 360–368. http://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4028-07.2008 
Tapper, K., Pothos, E. M., & Lawrence, A. D. (2010). Feast your eyes: hunger and trait 
reward drive predict attentional bias for food cues. Emotion (Washington, D.C.), 
10(6), 949–954. http://doi.org/10.1037/a0020305 
Theeuwes, J., & Belopolsky, A. V. (2012). Reward grabs the eye: Oculomotor capture by 
rewarding stimuli. Vision Research, 74, 80–85. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.visres.2012.07.024 
Thorndike, E. L. (1911). Animal intelligence; experimental studies. New York: The 
Macmillan company. 
Tindell, A. J., Smith, K. S., Berridge, K. C., & Aldridge, J. W. (2009). Dynamic computation 
of incentive salience: “wanting” what was never “liked.” Journal of Neuroscience, 
29(39), 12220–12228. http://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2499-09.2009 
Toates, F. (1986). Motivational systems. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, & Office of the Surgeon General. (2016). 
Facing Addiction in America: The Surgeon General’s Report on Alcohol, Drugs, and 
Health. Washington DC. 
Voon, V., Mole, T. B., Banca, P., Porter, L., Morris, L., Mitchell, S., … Irvine, M. (2014). 
Neural correlates of sexual cue reactivity in individuals with and without 
compulsive sexual behaviours. PLoS ONE, 9(7). 
http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0102419 
Wang, L., Duan, Y., Theeuwes, J., & Zhou, X. (2014). Reward breaks through the inhibitory 
region around attentional focus. Journal of Vision, 14(12), 2. 
 146 
http://doi.org/10.1167/14.12.2 
Watson, P., Wiers, R. W., Hommel, B., & De Wit, S. (2014). Working for food you don’t 
desire. Cues interfere with goal-directed food-seeking. Appetite, 79, 139–148. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.appet.2014.04.005 
Weinstein, A., & Lejoyeux, M. (2010). Internet Addiction or Excessive Internet Use. The 
American Journal of Drug and Alcohol Abuse, 36(5), 277–283. 
http://doi.org/10.3109/00952990.2010.491880 
Wilson, C. L., Sherman, J. E., & Holman, E. W. (1981). Aversion to the reinforcer 
differentially affects conditioned reinforcement and instrumental responding. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology. Animal Behavior Processes, 7(2), 165–74. 
http://doi.org/10.1037//0097-7403.7.2.165 
Wise, R. A. (2004). Dopamine, learning and motivation. Nature Reviews. Neuroscience, 
5(6), 483–494. http://doi.org/10.1038/nrn1406 
Wyvell, C. L., & Berridge, K. C. (2001). Incentive sensitization by previous amphetamine 
exposure: increased cue-triggered “wanting” for sucrose reward. The Journal of 
Neuroscience : The Official Journal of the Society for Neuroscience, 21(19), 7831–40. 
http://doi.org/21/19/7831 [pii] 
Zhang, J., Berridge, K. C., Tindell, A. J., Smith, K. S., & Aldridge, J. W. (2009). A neural 
computational model of incentive salience. PLoS Computational Biology, 5(7), 9–14. 
http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000437 
 
